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IS TEXAS TOUGH ON CRIME BUT SOFf ON CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE? 
Adam M. Gershowitz* 
Although Texas is well known for imposing tough punishments on convicted 
defendants, it is surprisingly generous in affording criminal procedure protec-
tions. In a variety of areas, including search and seizure rules, confession 
requirements, the availability of bail, prosecutorial discovery obligations, and 
jury trial guarantees, Texas affords protections vastly in excess of what is 
required by the United States Constitution. Even more shocking, these criminal 
procedure guarantees come almost entirely from Texas statutes approved by 
the legislature, not activist rules imposed by judges. This Article explores 
Texas s reputation as a tough-on-crime state and the seeming inconsistency 
between Texas being tough on crime but generous on criminal procedure. 
Everyone knows that Texas is tough on crime. Over the last four decades, Texas 
has sent more than 1000 inmates to death row, making it the "capital of capital 
punishment."1 Texas is also a leader in incarceration: with nearly 175,000 of its 
residents behind bars,2 Texas ranks first in the nation in raw incarceration3 and 
second in per capita incarceration.4 Shaming punishments are also popular in the 
Lone Star State; one judge shamed so many offenders that his constituents elected 
him to Congress as a result.5 It is therefore not surprising that many people 
mistakenly think "Don't Mess With Texas" is the state's motto,6 rather than simply 
a clever bumper sticker designed to fight littering. 7 
* Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. An earlier draft of this Article was presented at the 
Southeastern Association of Law Schools panel "Is Criminal Procedure Less Counterrnajoritarian Than We 
Think?" I am grateful to Doug Berman, Corinna Barrett Lain, Arnold Loewy, Richard Meyers, and Ron Wright 
for helpful suggestions.© 2012, Adam M. Gershowitz. 
I. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties' Role in the 
Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REv. 307, 308 (2010) [hereinafter Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment] 
(referring to Texas as the "capital of capital punishment"). 
2. See HEATHER C. WEST, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DATA BRIEF: PRISONERS AT YEAREND 2009-ADVANCE COUNTS 
tbl. 1 (2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/py09ac.pdf. 
3. See Adam Liptak, 1 in JOOAdults Behind Bars, New Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,2008, at Al4 (noting 
that Texas had recently passed California in having the nation's largest number of inmates). 
4. See Mike McPhee, State's Inmate Count Up 3.3%: Growth Outpaces National Rate, DENVER POST, Aug. 12, 
2001, at B-04 (explaining that Texas had the second highest per capita incarceration rate, following Louisiana). 
5. See Ryan J. Huschka, Sorry for the Jackass Sentence: A Critical Analysis of the Constitutionality of 
Contemporary Shaming Punishments, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 803, 833-34 (2006) (explaining the popularity of 
judges who use shaming punishments). 
6. Ironically, the state motto is actually "Friendship." See Texas Facts, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 31, 
2001, at 2B. 
7. The slogan "Don't Mess With Texas" was created by the State Transportation Department for an 
anti-littering campaign in 1985. See "Don't Mess" with This Texas Slogan: State Agency Might Sue over Use of Its 
31 
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Yet, the story about Texas criminal justice is far more complicated than its 
reputation reveals. Despite its tough-on-crime reputation, Texas actually has 
numerous criminal procedure rules that are very favorable to criminal defendants. 
These pro-defendant protections are not mandated by the United States Constitu-
tion or the courts. Rather, Texas's pro-defendant criminal procedure rules are 
almost exclusively created by Texas statutes enacted by elected. legislators, not 
judges. 8 These protections include strict rules on the admissibility of confessions, 
extremely pro-defendant search and seizure guarantees, tough limits on denying 
bail to criminal defendants, favorable discovery rules, and expansive jury trial 
rights, to name a few. In some instances, the rules are so favorable to defendants 
that almost every other state in the nation has rejected them. These rules are a 
major hindrance to prosecutors and thus directly contradict the notion that Texas is 
universally hostile to criminal defendants. 
This Article explores Texas's reputation as a tough-on-crime state, as well as the 
little-known fact that the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure ("Texas Code") is 
quite favorable to criminal defendants. Of course, I do not want to overstate my 
case. I am not arguing that Texas has the most pro-defendant code of criminal 
procedure in the nation, nor am I asserting in any way that the protections Texas 
affords are bad public policy. Rather, I am simply making a descriptive observation 
that Texas is not nearly as tough as its reputation suggests when it comes to 
criminal procedure. Part I of this Article begins by reviewing reasons why Texas is 
commonly seen as tough on crime: from its use of the death penalty, to its packed 
prisons, to its indeterminate sentencing scheme which can result in huge upfront 
sentences that are reduced on the back-end by parole. Part II then reviews some of 
Texas's criminal procedure rules that make it far more favorable to criminal 
defendants than other states. Finally, Part III raises possible reasons for the 
inconsistency between Texas's punitiveness and its favorable criminal procedure 
rules. 
I. TEXAS Is TOUGH ON CRIME (OR So IT SEEMS) 
It is not hard to make the case for Texas being tough on crime. From capital 
punishment to incarceration to shaming sanctions, Texas is at the forefront of 
imposing stiff punishments. In the Sections below, I offer a brief tour of Texas's 
reputation for punitiveness. 
Catchphrase, ASSOCIATED PREss (June 6, 2004), http://www.msnbc.msn.cornlid/5151681/nslbusiness/t/don't-
mess. However, it was quickly co-opted by bumper sticker and t-shirt manufacturers. See id. 
8. Indeed, it is only recently that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the lockstep approach and began 
to interpret the Texas Constitution independently of the United States Constitution. See George E. Dix, Judicial 
Independence in Defining Criminal Defendants' Texas Constitutional Rights, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1374 (1990) 
("Texas has a tradition of general judicial passivity in criminal litigation." ); Jessica L. Schneider, Breaking Stride: 
The Texas Coun of Criminal Appeals ' Rejection of the Lockstep Approach 1988-1998, 62 ALB. L. REv. 1593, 
1598 (1999) . 
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A. The Capital of Capital Punishment 
Texas is the most frequent user of capital punishment in the United States, 
sending more people to death row than any other state.9 And unlike other states 
that frequently impose the death penalty, Io Texas actually carries out executions. II 
Since the Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment in 1976, Texas has 
executed more than 460 inmates, Iz which is well over one-third of all executions 
nationwide.I 3 In some years, Texas accounts for nearly half of all executions.I 4 
Because of its frequent use of the death penalty, Texas has been responsible for a 
large share of controversial executions, which has furthered the state's reputation 
for punitiveness. Is In 2007, the presiding judge of Texas's highest criminal court, 
Sharon Keller, received nearly universal condemnation for closing the courthouse 
doors at 5pm to an inmate seeking a stay of execution following a promising 
Supreme Court decision.I 6 Despite an initial finding of misconduct, Judge Keller 
was eventually spared any punishment on technical grounds, thus prolonging the 
firestorm about the failures of Texas's capital punishment system. 17 
In 2010, The New Yorker published an expose on the 2004 execution of 
Cameron Todd Willingham, who had been executed for killing his three children in 
conjunction with the arson of his home.I 8 Based on analysis by nationally 
9. See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-1977-2008 (last visited Jan. 24, 2012). Until 
2004, Texas was the consistent leader nationwide. See id. In recent years, Texas has taken a backseat to California 
and Florida. See id. 
10. For example, California has roughly 700 people languishing on death row. See State by State Database, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last visited Jan. 24, 2012). 
11. See Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2012), available at http://www.death 
penaltyinfo.orgldocuments/FactSheet.pdf (providing statistics showing Texas's execution rate of roughly four-
teen people per year to be higher than that of any other state). 
12. See id. 
13. See id. 
14. For instance, in 2009, Texas was responsible for twenty-four of the fifty-two executions in the United 
States. 2009 Execution Statistics, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/home (follow 
"Execution Database" hyper! ink; then search "Year" for "2009"; then follow "Apply" hyperlink). In 2006, Texas 
accounted fortwenty-four of the fifty-three executions. See 2006 Execution Statistics, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/home (follow "Execution Database" hyper! ink; then search "Year" for "2006"; 
then follow "Apply" hyperlink). 
15. See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Controversy Builds in Texas over an Execution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 
2009, at A4 (discussing the national attention paid to Texas executions). 
16. See, e.g., Michael Hall, The Judgment of Sharon Keller: As She Goes on Trial This Month, Nearly 
Everyone-Journalists, Lawyers, and Even Some of Her Colleagues-Is Calling for Her Head, TEX. MoNTHLY, 
Aug. 1, 2009, at 106; Hilary Hylton, A Texas Judge on Trial: Closed to a Death-Row Appeal?, TIME (Aug. 13, 
2009), http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816, 1915814,00.html. 
17. See Mary Alice Robbins, Case Closed: Special Court of Review Vacates Public Warning, Charges Against 
Keller, TEX. LAWYER, Oct. 18, 2010, at 1, http://www.law.uh.edu/news/faculty-news/Fal12010/1018Dow.pdf. 
Rather than quietly let the sorry episode disappear, the judge lashed out at critics by brashly (and inaccurately) 
claiming, "I won ... People can call it what they want." See id. 
18. See David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an innocent Man, THE NEw YORKER, Sept. 29,2009, at 
34. 
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renowned fire investigators, the article concluded that the fire had been accidental, 
not arson, and that Willingham had been innocent. 19 The article unleashed a 
mountain of negative publicity about Texas's use of capital punishment.20 And 
rather than own up to the wrongful execution, state leaders attempted to scuttle the 
truth?1 Just two days before a forensic commission was due to begin hearings on 
the matter, Governor Rick Perry replaced the head of the body, and the new 
commissioner promptly canceled the hearing, leading once again to major national 
coverage. 22 
Less than a year later, Texas made headlines with the release of death row 
inmate Anthony Graves, who was not simply mistakenly convicted, 23 but was 
railroaded onto death row as a result of egregious prosecutorial misconduct. 24 
Graves was the twelfth Texas inmate exonerated from death row since the 
reinstatement of capital punishment.25 
Nor are controversies over the Texas death penalty exclusively of recent 
vintage. The 1998 execution of Karla Faye Tucker, a born-again Christian who 
found God in prison, sparked a national debate about rehabilitation when then-
Governor George W. Bush refused to pardon her.Z6 And Governor Bush's seeming 
indifference to whether the death penalty had been fairly administered under his 
watch-along with criticism of his legal team's inattention to clemency requests27-
tagged Texas with a reputation for executing first and asking questions later, or 
perhaps not at all. 28 
The dozens of Texas death penalty cases decided by the Supreme Court have left 
an indelible impression that Texas is synonymous with capital punishment. 29 And 
19. See id. 
20. See, e.g., McKinley, Jr., supra note 15. 
21. See Christy Hoppe, Perry Ousts Officials Before Arson Hearing: He's Assailed as New Head Delays 
Session on Flawed Case That Led to Execution, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. I, 2009, at I. 
22. See id.; see also Steve Mills, Texas Death Penalty Inquiry Shaken: The Chairman, Fired Recently by Gov. 
Perry, Says Officials Pressured Him in the Case of an Executed Man, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12,2009, at 15. 
23. See Former Death Row Inmate Freed in Texas, NAT'L Pus. RADIO, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, Oct. 28, 2010; 
Brian Rogers, Prisoner Ordered Free from Texas Death Row, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 28,2010, at I. 
24. See Brian Rogers, Prosecutors Blast Former DA Who Handled Graves Case, Hous. CHRO~ .• Oct. 28, 
2010, at AI. 
25. See Innocence and the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFo. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
innocence-and-death-penalty#inn-st (last visited Jan. 24, 2012). 
26. See, e.g., Sam Howe Verhovek, Karla Tucker Is Now Gone but Several Debates Linger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 
1998, atA\2. 
27. See Alan Berlow, The Texas Clemency Memos, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2003 (recounting the slipshod 
work of legal counsel Alberto Gonzales in analyzing clemency petitions, and observing that Governor Bush never 
looked at clemency petitions tiled by inmates, only summaries compiled by Gonzales); see also R. Jeffrey Smith, 
Attorneys Criticize Gonzales Clemency Memos, WASH. PosT, Jan. 6, 2005, at A04 (same). 
28. See, e.g., Derrick Z. Jackson, Op-Ed, Bush's "Blind" Justice in Texas, Bos. GLOBE, July 2, 2003, at Al9. 
29. For a sampling of the most notable decisions, see Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005); Callins v. 
Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); 
Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 
(1981); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
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in a number of recent cases, the Supreme Court has smacked down Texas capital 
convictions as unconstitutional.30 
Of course, the amount of attention paid to capital punishment in Texas is 
disproportionate to its real-world impact.31 The State of Texas handles more than 
700,000 criminal cases per year,32 including more than 1000 homicides.33 Death-
penalty prosecutions account for only a few dozen of those cases.34 Yet, rhetoric 
often outpaces reality. Both supporters and opponents of tough-on-crime policies 
point to Texas's use of capital punishment to make their cases.35 The result is near 
universal agreement that Texas is the national leader in the death penalty and that it 
is tough on crime.36 As detailed below, other criminal justice policies in Texas 
reinforce the state's reputation for punitiveness. 
30. See Mil/er-E/, 545 U.S. at 231 (''The state court's conclusion that the prosecutors' strikes of Fields and 
Warren were not racially determined is shown up as wrong to a clear and convincing degree; the state court's 
conclusion was unreasonable as well as erroneous."); Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumenthal, Death Sentences in 
Texas Cases Try Supreme Court's Patience, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, at AI ("In the past year, the Supreme Court 
has heard three appeals from inmates on death row in Texas, and in each case the prosecutors and the lower courts 
suffered stinging reversals."); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5 to 4, Overturn 3 Texas Death Sentences, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2007, at A22. 
31. Professor Doug Berman has raised a related point about the Supreme Court's excessively large death 
penalty docket and its focus on fixing individual errors in capital cases. Douglas A. Berman, A Capital Waste of 
Time? Examining the Supreme Court's Culture of Death, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 861 (2008). 
32. See 2010 County Court Activity Summary by Case Type, TEX. OFFICE OF CT. ADMIN., http:/1168.39.176.29/ 
OCA!ReportSelection.aspx (select "County Court Data Reports" from drop-down "Report Type" menu, and 
select "Case Activity by County" from drop-down "Report" menu; then follow "Continue" hyperlink; then search 
"From" for "January 2010" and ''To" for "December 2010"; then follow "Run Report" hyperlink) (noting more 
than 508,000 misdemeanor cases filed in county criminal courts during 2010); 2010 District Court Activity 
Summary by Case Type, TEx. OFFICE OF CT. ADMIN., http:/1168.39.176.29/0CA!ReportSelection.aspx (select 
"County Court Data Reports" from drop-down "Report Type" menu, and select "Case Activity by County" from 
drop-down "Report" menu; then follow "Continue" hyperlink; then search "From" for "January 2010" and "To" 
for "December 2010"; then follow "Run Report" hyperlink) (identifying more than 210,000 felony cases filed in 
2010). Additionally, justice of the peace courts in Texas handle more than two million fine-only misdemeanor 
cases per year. See 20 I 0 Justice Court Case load Trends, TEX. OFFICE OF CT. ADMIN., http:/1168.39.176.29/0CA/ 
ReportSelection.aspx (select "Justice Court Data Reports" from drop-down "Report Type" menu, and select 
"Case Activity by County" from drop-down "Report" menu; then follow "Continue" hyperlink; then search 
"From" for "January 2010" and "To" for "December 2010"; then follow "Run Report" hyperlink). 
33. See 2008 District Court Activity Summary by Case Type, TEX. OFFICE OF CT. ADMIN., http:/1168.39.176.29/ 
OCA/ReportSelection.aspx (select "District Court Data Reports" from drop-down "Report Type" menu, and 
select "Case Activity by County" from drop-down "Report" menu; then follow "Continue" hyperlink; then search 
"From" for "January 2008" and "To" for "December 2008"; then follow "Run Report" hyperlink) (identifying 
more than 1200 murder cases filed by indictment or information in Texas district courts during calendar year 
2008). 
34. See Adam M. Gershowitz,lmposing a Cap on Capital Punishment, 72 Mo. L. REv. 73, 93-94 (2007). 
35. See, e.g., Brandi Grissom, Perry's Death Penalty Stance a Mixed Bag Nationally, TEX. TRIB. (July 5, 2011 ), 
http://www.texastribune.org/texas-politics/2012-presidential-election/perrys-death-penalty-stance-a-mixed-bag-
nationally/. 
36. See Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment, supra note I, at 312. 
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B. Texas Is a National Leader in Incarceration 
While Texas is most famous for its use of the death penalty, it is also a leader in 
the total number of inmates incarcerated. Texas regularly vies for first place in this 
category with the much more populous state of California. 37 As of the end of 2008, 
Texas had more than 172,000 people in prison.38 California, which has twelve 
million more residents than Texas,39 had only 1100 more inmates.40 To its credit, 
Texas has taken steps to reduce its prison population by shifting offenders to 
substance abuse and mental health treatment centers.41 Yet, when 2009 came to a 
close, Texas still had more than 171,000 people incarcerated.42 
It is not just raw incarceration figures in which Texas is a leader. As a per capita 
matter, Texas ranks second nationally (behind Louisiana) in the number of inmates 
per residents.43 According to the National Institute of Corrections, Texas's incar-
ceration rate is about sixty percent higher than the national average.44 Texas also 
vastly exceeds the national average in terms of the percentages of people on 
probation and parole.45 
In almost every category of prison statistics, Texas leads the nation. As one 
author recently explained, 
The state's per capita imprisonment rate .. . [is] three times higher than the 
Islamic Republic of Iran's. Although Texas ranks fiftieth among states in the 
amount of money it spends on indigent criminal defense, it ranks first in prison 
growth, first in for-profit imprisonment, first in supermax lockdown, [and] first 
in total number of adults under criminal justice supervision .... 46 
37. See WU.LIAM J. SABOL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., PRISONERS IN 2008 app. 2 at 
17-18 (2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj .gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid= 1763 (indicating that Texas led the nation in 
incarcerations in 2000, but that California edged ahead in 2008). 
38. /d. 
39. Compare U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICK FACTS: CALIFORNIA, available at http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (2010 population estimate is 37,253,956), with U.S. CENSUS Bu-
REAU, STATE & CoUNTY QuiCK FACTS: TEXAS, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html 
(2010 population estimate is 25,145,561). 
40. SABOLETAL.,supranote37,at 17-18. 
41. See Unlikely Role Model: Tough-on-Crime Texas Leads the Way in Prison Refonns, Less Crowded Prisons, 
Hous. CHRON., Jan. 2, 2010, at Bl. 
42. WEST, supra note 2, at tbl. I. 
43. McPhee, supra note 4; see PEW CTR. ON mE STATES, TExAs 2 (2007), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/ 
uploadedFiles/TX%20State%20Profile%202-22-07 .pdf. 
44. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT' L INST. OF CORR., STATISTICS FOR THE STATE OF TExAS, available at http://nicic.gov/ 
StateStats/?st = tx. 
45. Seeid. 
46. ROBERT PERKINSON, TEXAS TOUGH: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S PRISON EMPIRE 4 (2010). 
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The huge number of persons sentenced to incarceration or awaiting trial in 
Texas has resulted in overcrowding at jails throughout the state.47 In counties 
across the state, this overcrowding has led a number of jails to fail inspection.48 
The overcrowding situation is so bad in Houston that the county government has 
had to contract with out-of-state jails to house hundreds of its inmates.49 Despite 
having added 100,000 prison beds since the 1980s, the number of Texas prisoners 
is shortly expected to exceed beds by 17,000.50 
Not surprisingly, the over-crowding of Texas prisons and jails goes hand-in-
hand with awful conditions of confinement. Local media regularly report inmate 
deaths occurring in jails due to overcrowding.51 Texas newspapers have also 
highlighted recent federal investigations of both Dallas and Houston jails for civil 
rights violations.52 And Texas politicians do not appear remorseful about prison 
and jail conditions: although Texas spends forty-three percent less than the 
national average to incarcerate each inmate, 53 politicians regularly demand that it 
47. See TEX. CR!M. JUSTICE COAL., COSTLY CONFINEMENT & SENSIBLE SOLUTIONS: JAIL OVERCROWDING 3-4 
(20 I 0), http://www.criminaljusticecoalition.org/files/userfiles/Jail_ Overcrowding_Report_FOR_ WEB .pdf (iden-
tifying reasons for overcrowding among both county jails and private detention facilities) . 
48. See Lynne Brezosky, 1 in 3 Jails Failing State Check: Harris County Expected to Seek Bonds for More 
Beds at Facility, on 2006 List, Hous. CHRON. Apr. 2, 2007, at AI (noting that 73 of 286 jails failed inspection in 
2006 and that 4 jails inspected in the first few months of 2007 were under remedial orders for overcrowding). For 
a discussion of the most overcrowded jails, see Officials Trying to Ease Overcrowding, DALL. MORNING NEws, 
Aug. 14, 2010 (noting that Dallas jails failed inspections from 2003 until 2010, and that when the jail finally 
passed inspection in 2010, overcrowding threatened to put it out of compliance again); Tom Bower, Inmates Move 
into New Jail Annex; $26.4 Million Addition Raises Total Capacity to 4,294 Prisoners, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS· 
NEWS, Aug. 6, 2002, at 3B (noting that Bexar County jail failed inspection because nearly 400 inmates were 
sleeping on the floor due to lack of beds); Roma Khanna, Harris County Jail Fails Inspection: Overcrowding, 
Broken Toilets Among Complaints, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 18,2009, at 82 (describing effects of overcrowding); Ken 
Rodriguez, Commissioners' Concerns About Jail Go Unaddressed, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 30, 2009, 
at I B (noting that Bexar County jail had failed inspection six of the last eight years in part because of 
overcrowding). 
49. See Steve McVicker, First 60 Prisoners Bused to Louisiana: Crowding here Could Force County to 
Eventually Send 400 to Private Jail, Hous. CHRON., July 14, 2007, at 84 (describing transfer of Harris County 
inmates to Louisiana prisons); Chris Moran, Excess Jail Space to Reduce Tab for County Taxpayers, Hous. 
CHRON., Dec. 8, 2010, at 8 I (explaining how Harris County sends thousands of jail inmates to Louisiana because 
of lack of space). 
50. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 43, at I. 
51. See, e.g., Ed Housewright, Jailhouse Deaths Spur Lawsuit Against County: 63 Have Died in Seven Years, 
DALL. MoRNING NEws, Oct. 14, 2002, at A21 (describing a series of inmate deaths); Steve McVicker, Six Years, 
101 Deaths in Harris County Jails: Cruel and Unusual Punishment for Inmates?, Hous. CHRON. (Feb. 18, 2007), 
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Six -years· I 0 1-deaths-in-Harris-County-jails-1545025.php (ex-
plaining that the large jail population and staffing shortages result in a lack of adequate medical care). 
52. See Cindy George & Bill Murphy, Feds Launch Investigation of County Jail: Department of Justice 
Looking for Federal Violations, Hous. CHRON., March 8, 2008, at AI (discussing federal investigations of both 
Harris County and Dallas County jails). 
53. While the national average to incarcerate an inmate is approximately $24,000 per year, Texas spends less 
than$ 14,000. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NPJ'L INST. OF CORR., supra note 44. 
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be done cheaper.54 The result, not surprisingly, is terrible conditions of confine-
ment.55 
C. Huge Prison Sentences Create Big Headlines 
In addition to frequent use of capital punishment and overflowing prisons, Texas 
also makes headlines by imposing seemingly astronomical sentences in particular 
cases. For example, while the mean sentence for robbery defendants in the federal 
system is less than seven years,56 Texas's robbery defendants regularly receive 
sentences of forty-five, 57 fifty,58 seventy, 59 even ninety-nine60 years of incarcera-
tion. 
Consider the defendant who received thirty-five years for burglary,61 or the 
repeat driving-while-intoxicated ("DWI") defendant (who was charged as a 
habitual based on a robbery conviction from many years prior) who was sentenced 
to twenty-five years.62 White-collar offenders are not immune from stiff sentences 
either: an offender who stole between $100,000 and $200,000 received a sentence 
of twenty years,63 while a defendant recently convicted of laundering a similar 
amount of money received forty years.64 Similarly, one Texas drug offender caught 
with twenty-eight grams of cocaine (and with two prior drug infractions from years 
before) received a sentence of ninety-nine years.65 Sentences may thus seem 
unbelievably tough to the public not versed in the availability of parole-
particularly as the media only reports these large upfront sentences-and thus adds 
to Texas's reputation of being tough on crime. 66 
These huge sentences contribute to Texas's reputation for punitiveness (and 
rightly so), but they are somewhat deceiving given Texas's robust parole system. 
54. See Chris Moran, Eversole Slams Sheriff over Jail Outsourcing Costs, Hous. CHRON. (June 22, 2010), 
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article!Eversole-slams-sheriff-over-jail-outsourceing-costs-1717246. 
php (describing Harris County Commissioner Jerry Eversole's demands that inmates be housed in cheaper 
facilities). 
55. For an excellent account of the years of li ligation aimed at improving the conditions of Texas's prisons, see 
generally BEN M. CROUCH & JAMES W. MARQUART, AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE: LmGATED REFORM OF TEXAS PRISONS 
(1989). 
56. U.S. SENT'G COMM., STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET: FISCAL YEAR 2009, STATE OF TEXAS 10 (2010), 
http://www. ussc. gov /Data_and_S tati stics/Federal_Sentenci ng_ Statistics/State _District_ Circu i t/2009/tx09. pdf 
(identifying the national median and mean sentences for robbery in the federal system as 63 months and 82.2 
months). 
57. See, e.g., Clemons v. State, 893 S.W.2d 212,214 (Tex. App. 1995). 
58. See, e.g., Fluellen v. State, 71 S.W.3d 870, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 
59. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 857 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. App. 1993). 
60. See, e.g., Darden v. State, 430 S.W.2d 494, 495-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968). 
61. Tomas v. State, 707 S.W.2d 221,221 (Tex. App. 1986). 
62. Harris v. State, 204 S.W.3d 19,21-22 (Tex. App. 2006). 
63. Quast v. State, No. 01-02-00384-CR, 2003 WL 21470370, at *21-22 (Tex. App. 2003). 
64. King v. State, No. 01-08-00457-CR, 2009 WL 1025733, at* I (Tex. App. 2009). 
65. Davis v. State, 905 S. W.2d 655, 659 (Tex. App. 1995). 
66. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 
927-28 (2006) (discussing how criminal justice outsiders often misperceive the severity of punishments). 
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For most felonies, Texas law requires the defendant to serve only one-quarter of 
his sentence before becoming eligible for parole.67 And credit that prisoners 
receive for good behavior--days they did not actually serve-counts towards 
completing the one-fourth requirement.68 For the most serious felonies-murder, 
aggravated kidnapping, sexual assault, and a few others-the Code is slightly 
tougher and requires defendants to serve at least one-half of their sentences.69 Yet, 
even parole eligibility after serving half of a sentence is a stark contrast from the 
federal system and the many other states that have eliminated parole altogether.70 
The option for this early parole almost certainly figures into the sentencing 
decisions of judges and plea bargain offers of prosecutors. Judges and prosecutors 
who believe a defendant deserves three years' incarceration may impose a 
considerably longer sentence to offset parole eligibility and ensure that the 
defendant serves at least three years.7 t And because Texas has extremely broad 
sentencing ranges-for instance, five years to life for first degree felonies72-
prosecutors and judges have considerable room to increase sentences to account 
for the possibility of parole. 
The news media dutifully reports the large upfront sentences.73 After all, it is 
easy for reporters (who are already stationed in the courthouse) to generate stories 
67. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.§ 508.145(£) (West 2011). 
68. See id. For example, in an analysis of Texas offenders who had been paroled between September I, 2010 
and September I, 20 II for the crime of burglary of a habitation, I discovered many offenders who served well less 
than twenty-five percent of their sentences, with some serving less than fifteen percent. See Texas Department of 
Criminal Justice Response to Public Information Request of Adam Gershowitz, Dec. 12, 2011 (on file with the 
author). 
69. See§ 508.145(d). 
70. For a list of states that have abolished parole, see Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Legislatures, Judges, and 
Parole Boards: The Allocation of Discretion Under Determinate Sentencing, 62 FLA. L. REv. 1037, 1045-46 
(2010). 
71. Take the crime of bribery as an example. Under Texas law, bribery is a second degree felony, whi~h carries 
a sentencing range of two to twenty years. See TEx. PENAL CODE§ 12.33 (West 2011). The average bribery case 
would seem to be on the less serious end of the class of second degree felonies. (For instance, the crime of 
robbery, which involves force or threat of force, is also a second degree felony. See id. at § 29.02(b) (West 20 II). 
One would therefore expect bribery defendants to be sentenced on the lower end of the two-to-twenty-year 
sentencing range. Yet, there are cases in which defendants get much stiffer sentences. See, e.g., Matt Flores, 
ACCD Gets Good Report Card: But Strayhorn's Audit Urges Measures That Could Save Millions for District, SAN 
ANTONIO ExPRESS, Aug. 23, 2003, at B4 (noting that former official was sentenced to twelve years for bribery). 
These tougher sentences may be imposed simply because the defendant deserves the punishment. Another quite 
plausible explanation, however, is that prosecutors, suspecting that white-collar defendants charged with 
non-violent offenses will receive early parole, push for tougher upfront sentences to offset the possibility of early 
release. Cf Elizabeth Albanese, Ex-Trustee Loses Appeal, THE BoND BUYER, Oct. 10, 2006, at 41 (noting that 
Texas official sentenced to twelve years for bribery was released on probation after sixteen months). 
72. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.32 (West 2009). 
73. See, e.g., Serial Child Molester Is Sentenced to Life in Prison for Abusing 8 Boys in Arizona, WASH. PosT 
(Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/nationalfone-of-arizonas-most-prolific-child-molesters-sentenced-
to-560-years-in-prison/2012/0I/13/giQAPSibwP _story.html (reporting that one Arizona defendant received 
eleven consecutive life sentences). 
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when the facts are neatly packaged for them. News articles about how much time a 
paroled felon actually served are much harder to prepare, however.74 Thus, the 
general public hears about the huge upfront sentences, but not the shorter amount 
of time that inmates actually serve. 
This problem of misinformed or incomplete media reporting also applies before 
sentencing even occurs. When a defendant in a high-profile case is on trial, 
reporters regularly inform the public of the maximum punishment the defendant 
could receive even if, in reality, there is no chance the defendant will be sentenced 
anywhere close to that. Although this problem exists in criminal justice systems 
across the country, it is particularly problematic in Texas because of the state's 
broad sentencing ranges. Consider the crime of possession of certain controlled 
substances 75 -for instance 200 to 400 grams of codeine-which is a second-
degree felon/6 punishable by two to twenty years. 77 When NFL football player 
Johnny Jolly was arrested for codeine possession, the media explained that Jolly 
"face[d] up to twenty years in prison."78 Yet, when his case was actually resolved, 
Jolly escaped jail time and was placed on probation.79 
To be sure, Texas authorizes and imposes extremely lengthy sentences on many 
defendants. And even with early eligibility for parole, many offenders never again 
see the light of day after entering the Texas criminal justice system. Yet, when it 
comes to handing down astronomical sentences, Texas's bark appears to be worse 
than its bite. In many cases, the availability of parole greatly offsets the ultimate 
time served, though not Texas's reputation for toughness. 
74. Indeed, even legal academics who rail against the Texas clemency system in death penalty cases have 
devoted virtually zero attention to analyzing how parole is granted in non-capital cases. A search of "parole w/1 0 
eligib! w/10 Texas" in the JLR database on Westlaw brings up only fifty-five entries, most of which relate to the 
death penalty. 
75. Another common example is the crime of DWI, which is a Class B misdemeanor for first-time offenders. 
See TEX. PENAL CODE§ 49.04 (West 2011). Television and newspaper stories across the state regularly report that 
the defendant could be sentenced to up to 180 days of incarceration if convicted. For example, when the daughter 
of Houston 's mayor was charged with DWI, media reports regularly stated that she faced "up to 180 days in jail." 
See, e.g. , Dale Lezon, Deputy Says Mistakes Made in Mayors Daughters Arrest: Elena White Pleads Not Guilty 
in First Day a/Her DWI Trial, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 6, 2007, at 83. But in the overwhelming majority of cases, the 
defendant typically receives probation and serves no jail time. See Adam M. Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men: 
The Case for Eliminating Jury Trials in Drunk Driving Cases, 2011 U. ILL L. REv. 961, 965 [hereinafter 
Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men). Thus, a criminal justice outsider who follows mainstream media coverage 
might believe that Texas punishes its DWI offenders far more harshly than it actually does. 
76. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 481.118(d) (West 2011). 
77. See TEX. CODE CRJM. PRoc. ANN. art. 12.33 (West 2011). 
78. See NFL League Suspends Jolly for 2010: Packers DE Facing Drug Charges After 2008 Arrest, Hous. 
CHRON.,July 17, 2010, at6. 
79. See Deal Gets Jolly Out of Drug Trial: Packers DE Can Have Case Dismissed if He Fulfills Probation 
Requirements, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 4. 2010, at 7. And while the media reported both the statutorily authorized and 
actual sentences in Jolly 's case, in many cases with less famous defendants , news reports cover only the maximum 
statutorily authorized sentence without running a story when the defendant ultimately receives one far milder. 
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D. Shaming Punishments Attract Enormous Attention 
Over the last few decades, shaming punishments have garnered increased 
attention.80 Academics have almost universally condemned shaming on numerous 
grounds, including the harm caused to human dignity.81 Despite all the academic 
attention, shaming punishments are still fairly rare in the criminal justice system.82 
Yet, when such punishments are imposed, they receive enormous media attention. 
And Texas has received a healthy size of that attention. 
In the 1990s, the so-called "King of Shame" in the United States was Ted Poe, a 
felony court judge in Houston, Texas.83 Judge Poe imposed a variety of shaming 
punishments, including sandwich boards, public apologies, and a requirement that 
DWI offenders place bumper stickers on their cars announcing their crimes.84 
Judge Poe was known both for the creativity of these alternative sanctions and also 
for the sheer number-more than 300--that he imposed.85 Poe apparently relished 
the publicity that carne with alternative sanctions and even coined a term-"Poe-
tic Justice"86-for his punishments. Local news stories about Poe's sentences 
abounded,87 and Poe turned his publicity into a seat in the United States House of 
Representatives. 88 
The actions of a single Houston judge would not be particularly remarkable, 
except that the publicity has drawn national attention to Texas. For example, a 
recent story in USA Today discussed how former-Judge Poe had sentenced 
offenders to shovel manure and how another Texas judge had ordered an 
abusive father to sleep in a doghouse for thirty days. 89 Similar stories 
about Poe's creative sentences have appeared in The Washington Post,90 The 
80. For an example in the academic literature, see Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal 
Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1880 (1991) (criticizing shaming punishments); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Altenzative 
Sanctions Mean , 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591 (1996) (favoring shaming punishments). 
81 . See Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for 
the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2157,2219 (2001) ("Because shaming punishments have as 
their goal the destruction of a person 's reputation and dignity the shaming punishment denies the very dignity of 
moral agency that the retributive encounter is designed to uphold."). 
82. See Huschka, supra note 5, at 815. 
83. !d. at 833. 
84. See Developments in the Law, The Legality of Innovative Alternative Sanctions for Nonviolent Crimes, Ill 
HARV. L. REV. 1944, 1949 & n.47 (1998). 
85. See Huschka, supra note 5, at 833. 
86. /d. 
87. See The Original Shame Sentence? Rattling the Bones in Ted Poe s Closet, Hous. PRESS, Jan. 22, 2004 ("In 
22 years as a Harris County district judge, Lloyd 'Ted' Poe garnered gallons of ink and miles of videotape from a 
fawning local media with his zany so-called shame sentences for defendants in his court."). 
88. See Huschka, supra note 5, at 833-34. 
89. See Jonathan Turley, Shaming Undermines Justice: Americans May Cheer the Idea of Retributive 
Punishment, but Such Judgments Threaten the Principles of Our Legal System, USA TODAY, Nov. 17,2009, at 
Al3. 
90. See Jonathan Turley, Shame on You, WASH. PosT (Sept. 17, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynl 
content/article/2005/09/17/AR2005091700064.html. 
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Baltimore Sun,91 Los Angeles Times,92 The Boston Globe,93 and local newspapers 
around the country.94 Poe even appeared on Oprah Winfrey's nationally syndicated 
television show to discuss his shaming sanctions.95 Even after leaving the bench 
and spending half a decade in Congress, Poe has continued to tour the country 
advocating shaming sanctions.96 In a Pittsburgh suburb, a prosecutor sought a 
shaming sanction after hearing Congressman Poe speak to a district attorney's 
conference in 2009.97 The prosecutor explained that Poe is "sort of the modem 
father of this kind of stuff. So we thought we'd give it a try."98 
It is important not to make too much of Judge Poe's notoriety, or to focus too 
heavily on shaming sanctions themselves. As with the death penalty, shaming 
sanctions are still relatively rare in the context of the entire Texas justice system. 
Nevertheless, just like capital punishment, the association of shaming sanctions 
with Texas serves to foster the state's reputation for being tough on crime. 
*** 
As Part I demonstrates, it is not difficult to see why Texas has a reputation for 
being tough on crime. The story is, of course, more nuanced than the bumper 
sticker warning not to mess with Texas. In recent years, the Texas criminal justice 
system has improved mental health care, added drug and alcohol treatment, and 
imposed less stringent penalties for violations of parole and probation.99 At 
bottom, it seems fairly clear that Texas has earned a national reputation for being 
tough on defendants who have been convicted, although there is good reason to 
believe its reputation is somewhat exaggerated. As detailed in Part II, even if we 
91. See Kate Shatzkin, Shame Becomes a Barb in Judges' Quivers, BALT. SuN, May 17, 1998, atA20 (quoting 
then-Judge Poe). 
92. See Kate Shatzkin, Judges Are Resorting to Shame in Sentencing Criminals: Criminals Wear Placards or 
Apologize to Victims Publicly, but Some Legal Experts Say the Tactic Is Useless at Best and Repugnant at Worst, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1998 (same). 
93. See Michael Grunwald, Shame Makes a Comeback in Courtrooms: US Judges Say Public Humiliations 
Can Work Better Than Prison Time, Bos. GLOBE, Dec. 28, 1997 (describing Judge Poe as a "leading advocate"). 
94. For a sampling of the numerous articles, see Tim Hrenchir, Innovative Judge to Speak at Dinner, TOPEKA 
CAP. J., Mar. 30,2002, at I ("A Texas district judge known for giving out sentences designed to shame criminals, 
Poe will be guest speaker for the annual fund-raising banquet of Crime Stoppers of Topeka Inc."); Lyda Longa, 
Does Shame Deter Crime? That's a Matter of Opinion, ATLANTA J. CONST., June 21, 1999, at AI (describing 
"Texas State Judge Poe" as a "leading proponent"). 
95. See Sarah Fenske, After Oprah: Ted Poe Got the Spotlight for a Shame-Based Sentencing-The Victim Says 
It Was a Sham, Hous. PREss (Oct 7, 2004), http://www.houstonpress.com/2004-l ()..()7/news/after-oprah/. 
96. See Jon Schmitz & Torsten Ove, Sentence for Theft Is Humiliation in Bedford Town Center, PITTSBURGH 
PosT-GAZETTE, Nov. 4, 2009, at AI. 
97. ld. 
98. /d. 
99. See Gray Rohrer, Florida Senators Look to Texas for Prison System Cuts: But Money-Saving Programs 
Could Be Too Costly in Tight Budget Year, SuNSHINE ST. NEws (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/ 
story/florida-senators-look-texas-prison-system-cuts. 
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assume Texas is tough on punishment, the complete picture is far more compli-
cated because Texas appears to be quite generous on criminal procedure. 
II. TEXAS Is PROGRESSIVE (OR kr LEAST NOT "TOUGH") ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
As every student of criminal procedure knows, the Supreme Court ofthe United 
States sets a floor of minimum protection for each constitutional guarantee. 100 
States may not adopt rules that fall beneath that floor (for example, they may not 
eliminate the right to counsel guaranteed by Gideon v. Wainwright), 101 but they are 
free to adopt more protective ones (for instance, to mandate counsel in all 
misdemeanor cases, although the Supreme Court has not required it). 102 While no 
two states have identical codes of criminal procedure, it is clear that some states 
have gone well beyond what the Supreme Court mandates, while others have 
afforded little additional protection for criminal defendants. 103 Given Texas's 
tough-on-crime reputation, conventional wisdom would suggest that the Texas 
Code of Criminal Procedure should offer criminal defendants little or no added 
protection beyond the guarantees of the United States Constitution. That conven-
tional wisdom, however, is wrong. 
In a variety of areas, Texas has adopted criminal procedure rules that are much 
more favorable to criminal defendants than has been required by the Supreme 
Court. While some of these guarantees may be characterized as nuisances to 
prosecutors, many of the added protections are major hindrances to their efforts to 
convict criminal defendants. Moreover, because most of these protective rules 
exist by statute, they could be eliminated by a simple legislative vote. Yet, efforts 
to scale back these statutory guarantees have been rejected time and again by the 
Texas legislature. 
In the Sections that follow, I review a number of the most salient protections 
afforded by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure as well as a few rights 
guaranteed by the Texas Constitution. My purpose is not to argue that these 
protections are unnecessary or harmful to the criminal justice system. To the 
contrary, in many areas, the Texas rules helpfully fill in gaps where the Supreme 
Court has been insufficiently protective of criminal defendants. My point is to 
100. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 585 (2005) [hereinafter 
Gershowitz, Gideon]. 
10 l. 372 U.S. 335 (I 963) (guaranteeing indigent felony defendants a right to appointed counsel); see 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) ("We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, 
no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was 
represented by counsel at his trial."). 
102. See State ex rei. Winnie v. Harris, 249 N.W.2d 791 (1977) (extending the right to counsel in Wisconsin 
state court to all cases in which the possibility of incarceration exists, rather than all cases in which incarceration 
is actually imposed). 
103. See generally David C. Brody, Criminal Procedure Under State Law: An Empirical Examination of 
Selective New Federalism, 23 JusT. SYs. J. 75 (2002). 
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demonstrate that even though Texas is a tough-on-crime state, it has a remarkable 
number of generous statutory rules of criminal procedure. 
A. Unlike Almost Every Other State, Texas Has No Inevitable Discovery 
Exception, Making It Difficult to Admit Illegally Seized Evidence 
For nearly three decades, the Supreme Court has recognized an inevitable 
discovery exception that allows prosecutors to admit illegally seized evidence 
when the trial court finds the police eventually would have found it in a lawful 
fashion. 104 By way of example, imagine that a police officer pulls over a suspect 
for drunk driving. Upon arresting the driver, the officer unlawfully searches the 
trunk of the car and finds cocaine. 105 Even though the cocaine was actually found 
during an illegal search, it would be admissible in most courthouses under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine: Upon arrest for drunk driving, the car would have 
been impounded and the trunk would have been inventoried pursuant to depart-
ment policy. 106 At that point, the bag of cocaine would inevitably have been 
discovered, thus making it admissible. 107 This scenario-and the dozens of similar 
ones that occur daily in the United States-demonstrates why prosecutors love the 
inevitable discovery exception. 108 
When the Supreme Court officially recognized the inevitable discovery doctrine 
in 1984,109 it came as no surprise. In a brief opinion, the Court remarked that every 
federal court of appeals in the nation and many state courts had already endorsed 
the inevitable discovery doctrine. 110 And the trend has remained one-directional. 
Almost thirty years after the Supreme Court's decision, only two states in the 
country expressly reject the inevitable discovery doctrine: Texas and Indiana. 111 
I 04. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (adopting the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary 
rule). 
I 05. The search of the trunk is unconstitutional because police cannot search the trunk of the car incident to 
arrest, there is no consent for search of the trunk, nor any probable cause to believe contraband is located there. 
See State v. Ferguson, 678 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) ("Although there was probable cause to arrest the 
defendant ... the officers additionally needed a basis for believing that particular evidence of a crime or specific 
contraband was being concealed within the trunk before conducting a warrantless search."). 
106. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987) (upholding inventory searches of vehicles so long as 
police "discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of 
evidence of criminal activity"). 
107. See Ferguson, 67 S.W.2d at 877 ("The evidence [discovered during an illegal roadside search of 
defendant's trunk] would have been inevitably discovered [during subsequent inventory search] if it had not been 
removed during the roadside search."). 
108. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and Causation: Hudson v. Michigan and Its Ancestors, 
93 IowA L. REv. 1741, 1814 (2008) (noting the frequency with which the inevitable discovery exception is 
invoked). 
109. See Nix, 467 U.S. 431. 
110. /d. at440& n.2. 
Ill. See State v. Flippo, 575 S.E.2d 170, 188 n.23 (W. Va. 2002) ("Only [Indiana and Texas] appear to have 
expressly refused to recognize the inevitable discovery rule .... Additionally, we have found only three states, 
South Carolina, Vermont, and Wyoming, ... that appear never to have directly addressed the issue of the 
inevitable discovery rule."). 
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The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure rejects the inevitable discovery doctrine 
by statute. 112 The state's exclusionary rule expressly forbids the admission of any 
evidence obtained "in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the 
State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America."113 
In 1996, Texas's highest criminal court explicitly rejected prosecutors' arguments 
to ignore the plain text of the Code, 114 practically inviting the legislature to amend 
the statute: 
Were we implementing a court-made rule we would of course be free to follow 
the lead of the United States Supreme Court. However, because this is a statute 
enacted by the Texas Legislature, we are required to interpret the language of 
the statute in order to implement the legislative intent in enacting it. 115 
A concurring judge was even blunter, noting that the Texas courts are "obliged to 
implement the expressed will of the Legislature.'' 116 Despite these direct refer-
ences to the legislature's primacy and two impassioned dissents to the decision to 
bar the inevitable discovery exception, 117 the Texas legislature has never moved to 
revise the Code so as to authorize the exception. 118 
The Code of Criminal Procedure's continued rejection of the inevitable discov-
ery doctrine makes Texas a complete outlier. The only other state to completely 
reject the doctrine-Indiana-has done so based on its state constitution, not 
because of a statute that could be overruled by legislative action. 119 Texas stands 
alone in rejecting the inevitable discovery doctrine by statutory design. Consider-
ing how prosecutors are hampered by the lack of an inevitable discovery excep-
tion, the legislature's inaction is nothing short of stunning. 
112. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 2011). 
113. /d. 
114. See State v. Daugherty, 931 S. W.2d 268, 269-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 
115. /d. at 271. 
I 16. /d. at 274 (Baird, J. , concurring). 
117. See id. (McCormick, J. , concurring in part) ; id. at 281 (Mansfield, J. , dissenting). 
118. The text of article 38.23 has changed very little since it was implemented in 1925, despite numerous court 
decisions interpreting it. See Nathan L. Mechler, Texas's Statutory Exclusionary Rule: Analyzing the Inadequacies 
of the Current Application of "Other Person(s)" Pursuant to Anicle 38.23(a) of the Texas Code ;f Criminal 
Procedure, 36 ST. MARY's L.J. 195, 207-09 (2004). 
119. See Ammons v. State, 770 N.E.2d 927, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("[T]he inevitable discovery exception 
has not been adopted as a matter of Indiana constitutional law. Our state supreme court has previously held that 
our state constitution mandates that the evidence found as a result of an unconstitutional search be suppressed. In 
light of this clear language we are not inclined to adopt the inevitable discovery rule as Indiana constitutional 
law.") (internal citations omitted); see also Bradford R. Shively, The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine: Indiana as 
the Exception, Not the Rule, 43 VAL. U. L. REv. 407,430-32 (2008). 
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B. Texas Has an Expansive Exclusionary Rule That Suppresses Evidence 
Illegally Seized by Private Actors 
As all criminal justice observers know, the United States Constitution requires 
the suppression of evidence found by illegal police activity. 120 Texas's statutory 
exclusionary rule goes even further by excluding evidence illegally procured by 
private citizens. 121 Similar to the lack of an inevitable discovery exception, Texas's 
expansive exclusionary rule is drastically out-of-step with the rest of the nation and 
very beneficial to criminal defendants. 
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure specifies that "[n]o evidence obtained by 
an officer or other person in violation of [federal or state law] ... shall be admitted 
in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case." 122 Under this 
rule, if an individual citizen violates a statutory or constitutional guarantee and 
turns the resulting evidence over to the police, that evidence will be inadmissible, 
even if the police had no connection to the misconduct. 123 
For example, in 2005, a priest in Grand Prairie, Texas was charged with 
possession of child pornography. 124 Because the lurid images had been illegally 
procured by private actors-another priest and a church deacon-who searched 
his computer without consent, the judge was forced to suppress the photos. 125 With 
no evidence to rely on, state prosecutors had no choice but to dismiss the 
charges. 126 Although Texas's statutory exclusionary rule decimated the state 
prosecution, federal prosecutors were not restricted by a private actor exclusionary 
rule. 127 Federal prosecutors therefore charged the then-former priest with violation 
of federal child pornography laws and relied on the very same evidence that was 
inadmissible in Texas state court. 128 The former priest pleaded guilty to the federal 
charges and was sentenced to more than four years in federal prison. 129 
Texas stands alone in embracing a private actor exclusionary rule. In addition to 
the federal system, every other state in the nation admits evidence that was 
unlawfully seized by private actors. 130 
120. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
121. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 2011). 
122. /d. (emphasis added). 
123. See, e.g., Robert Tharp, Evidence Against Priest Tossed in Child Porn Case: GP: Judge Says Evidence 
Was Searched lllega/ly, DALL. MORNING NEws, June 10, 2006, at IB (describing the exclusion of evidence 
illegally obtained by private citizens). 
124. See id. 
125. See id. 
126. See Jason Trahan, Former Grand Prairie Priest Sentenced to 51-Month Prison Term for Viewing Child 
Porn, DALL. MORNING NEws, Dec. 2, 2009, at IB (explaining that federal charges were brought after state 
prosecutors were forced to drop the case for lack of evidence). 
127. See id. 
128. See id. 
129. See id. 
130. See Smith v. State, 623 So. 2d 382 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993); Cullom v. State, 673 P.2d 904 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1983); Hill v. State, 868 S.W.2d 44 (Ark. 1990); People v. Warren, 219 Cal. App. 3d 619 (1990); People v. Siegl, 
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There is a historical reason why Texas has such an expansive private actor 
exclusionary rule. Prior to prohibition, Texas had its own liquor laws, and private 
vigilante groups assisted the police in searching for unlawful whiskey. 131 When the 
Texas legislature drafted its exclusionary rule in 1925, legislators were concerned 
that these vigilante organizations might take matters into their own hands and 
undertake searches without police participation, and that private citizens would 
then hand the evidence to law enforcement on a "silver platter." 132 The legislature 
thus adopted an exclusionary rule that barred evidence seized illegally by private 
citizens. 133 
With the disappearance of prohibition and organized vigilante organizations, the 
rationale for a private-party exclusionary rule has, at least in part, disappeared. 134 
However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has refused to eliminate the rule. 135 
In a recent opinion, the Court explained: "Until the Legislature itself decides that 
the type of vigilante action prevalent during the early Prohibition era is no longer a 
threat to the privacy interests of Texas citizens, we are bound to follow both the 
plain language and the manifest legislative intent of the [statute]." 136 
The Texas legislature has considered legislation that would delete the "other 
person" language, but declined to act on it. Shortly after the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals held in 1995 that the statutory exclusionary rule applied to 
evidence gathered by private citizens, the Texas House of Representatives intra-
914 P.2d 511 (Colo. App. 1996); State v. Betts, 942A.2d 364 (Conn. 2008); State v. Phillips, 366A.2d 1203 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1976); Pomerantz v. State, 372 So. 2d 104 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Pruitt v. State, 373 S.E.2d 192 
(Ga. 1988); State v. Araki, 923 P.2d 891 (Haw. 1996); State v. Johnson, 716 P.2d 1288 (Idaho 19S6); People v. 
Clements, 400 N.E.2d 483 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Gajdos v. State, 462 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. 1984); State v. Flynn, 360 
N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1985); State v. Boswell, 549 P.2d 919 (Kan. 1976); Brock v. State, 947 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1997); 
State v. Abram, 353 So. 2d 1019 (La. 1977); State v. LeGassey, 456 A.2d 366 (Me. 1983); Herbert v. State, 269 
A.2d 430 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 503 N.E.2d 654 (Mass. 1987); People v. 
Holloway, 267 N.W.2d 454 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1990); Lucas v. 
State, 381 So. 2d 140 (Miss. 1980); State v. Brasel, 538 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. 1976); State v. Christensen, 797 P.2d 
893 (Mont. 1990); State v. Jolitz, 435 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 1989); State v. Miller, 877 P.2d 1044 (Nev. 1994); State v. 
Keyser, 369 A.2d 224 (N.H. 1977); State v. Frank, 272 A.2d 309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971); State v. 
Hernandez, 865 P.2d 1206 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); People v. Adler, 50 N.Y.2d 730 (N.Y. 1980); State v. Sanders, 
395 S.E.2d 412 (N.C. 1990); State v. Seglen, 700 N.W.2d 702 (N.D. 2005); State v. Grant, 620 N.E.2d 50 (Ohio 
1993); Turner v. State, 542 P.2d 955 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Bryan, 457 P.2d 661 (Or. Ct. App. 1969); 
Commonwealth v. Borecky, 419 A.2d 753 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); State v. Pailon, 590 A.2d 858 (R.I. 1991); State v. 
McSwain, 355 S.E.2d 540 (S.C. 1987); State v. Cundy, 201 N.W.2d 236 (S.D. 1972); State v. Burroughs, 926 
S.W.2d 243 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Newbold, 581 P.2d 991 (Utah 1972); State v. Young, 12 A.3d 510 (Vt. 2010); 
Mills v. Commonwealth, 418 S.E.2d 718 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Agee, 552 P.2d 1084 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976); 
State v. Riser, 294 S.E.2d 461 (W.Va. 1982); Mears v. State, 190 N.W.2d 184 (Wis. 1971); State v. Heiner, 682 
P.3d 629 (Wyo. 1984). 
131. See Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28,34-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 
132. Id. at 35. 
133. See id. 
134. See id. at 36. 
135. See id. at 35-36. 
136. ld. at 36. 
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duced a bill to delete that language. 137 After the proposal was rejected, the bill was 
renewed in the subsequent legislative session, but failed once again. 138 
Texas's exclusionary rule is considerably more expansive than constitutionally 
required. The judiciary has made clear that the legislature alone can change this 
rule, yet the legislature has considered and rejected bills to do so. Thus, the Texas 
legislature has explicitly chosen to leave a pro-defendant statute on the books. 
C. Texas Has an Extremely Narrow Good Faith Exception 
In addition to rejecting the inevitable discovery doctrine and excluding evidence 
illegally seized by private actors, the Texas statutory exclusionary rule also 
contains a very narrow good faith exception. Unlike most jurisdictions, the Texas 
exclusionary rule does not allow evidence seized without probable cause to be 
admitted simply because of police good faith reliance on a warrant. 139 
In 1984, in United States v. Leon, the United States Supreme Court recognized a 
good faith exception for evidence seized based on a defective search warrant. t 40 In 
Leon, police had procured a warrant for drugs based on an informant's tip and 
confirming observations. 141 The trial court later ruled that there was insufficient 
evidence to create probable cause, thus rendering the warrant invalid. 142 On appeal 
to the Supreme Court, the legal question was whether evidence seized based on a 
warrant lacking probable cause could still be admissible if the officer had acted in 
good faith reliance on the warrant. 143 The Court sided with the prosecution and 
adopted a good faith exception, allowing for the admission of evidence seized with 
less than probable cause, 144 so long as the officer relied in good faith on a search 
warrant issued by a magistrate. 145 
137. See H.R. 2281, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997). 
138. See H.R. 1320, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999). 
139. See Matthew A. Nelson, An Appeal in Good Faith: Does the Leon Good Faith Exception to the 
Exclusionary Rule Apply in West Virginia?, 105 W. VA. L. REv. 719, 747-50 (2003) (discussing adoption and 
rejection of the good faith exception). 
140. See 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
141. See id. at 901-02. 
142. See id. at 903. 
143. See id. at 905. 
144. See id. at 926. The Court did issue caveats indicating that the good faith exception could not apply if the 
magistrate was not detached or if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing the warrant application. See 
id. 
145. The Supreme Court's good faith exception caused great concern among the Court's more liberal Justices 
because they believed it would green-light police to conduct searches in the absence of probable cause. In the end, 
however, the decision has been primarily symbolic. See id. at 928-29 (Brennan and Marshall, J.J., dissenting) . 
Police officers rarely procure warrants because most searches fall under one of the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. It is even rarer for police to procure a warrant, execute it in good faith , but later find out that there 
was insufficient evidence to support probable cause. Nevertheless, most states have embraced the Supreme 
Court's good faith exception. For a discussion of these points and criticism of the Leon decision on a more 
fundamental level, see Donald A. Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906 (1986). 
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Many states have accepted the Supreme Court's invitation and adopted a good 
faith exception for warrants lacking probable cause. 146 Once again, however, 
Texas has declined to adopt the rule favored by prosecutors. The Texas statutory 
exclusionary rule clearly states that the good faith exception applies only to a 
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate "based on probable cause."147 Despite 
protestations by prosecutors, Texas courts have maintained for over two decades 
that the Texas good faith exception can only apply to small technical requirements 
(such as typographical errors or omissions) in warrants, not to a lack of probable 
cause. 148 
On multiple occasions, legislators have introduced bills to bring the Texas rule 
into line with the federal good faith exception. 149 In 1995, 1997, and 2007, the 
Texas legislature rejected these bills, 150 thus retaining a more defendant-friendly 
good faith exception. 
D. The Texas Code Imposes Tough Restrictions on Admitting Confessions 
In addition to the protective search and seizure rules discussed above, the Texas 
Code of Criminal Procedure also imposes significant restrictions on confessions 
that are not required by the federal Constitution. 
In the eyes of juries, confessions are typically the most powerful evidence 
against criminal defendants. 151 Prosecutors thus love confessions. 152 Because 
confessions are so powerful, they are particularly useful when other evidence is 
lacking. As a result, police may push hardest for a confession-and use improper 
tactics-in the very cases where the evidence is the weakest, thus leading to the 
146. See Nelson, supra note 139, at 747-50 (discussing states that have adopted and rejected the good faith 
exception). 
147. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(b) (West 2011) (emphasis added). 
!48. See Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899,912-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (rejecting good faith exception). 
!49. See H.R. 1578, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007); H.R. 1365, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); H.R. 
2047, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995). 
!50. See H.R. 1578, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007); H.R. 1365, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); H.R. 
2047, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995). 
!51. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Behavioral Confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of 
Presuming Guilt, 27 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 187, 187 (2003) ("In criminal law, confession evidence is the state's 
most potent weapon. Mock jury studies have shown that confessions are more persuasive than other forms of 
incriminating evidence, such as eyewitness identifications or character testimony."); Saul M. Kassin & Holly 
Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the '"Harmless Error" Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 27,42-43 (1997) ("[M]ockjurors did not sufficiently discount a defendant's confession in reaching a 
verdict--even when they saw the confession as coerced .... Our results thus suggest that confession evidence has 
a profound, context-resistant impact on jurors and should be admitted only with extreme caution."). 
!52. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 
N.C. L. REV. 891, 922 (2004) ("Like police, prosecutors rarely consider the possibility that an entirely innocent 
suspect has been made to confess falsely .... When there is a confession, prosecutors tend to charge the defendant 
with the highest number and types of offenses and are far less likely to initiate or accept a plea bargain to a reduced 
charge."). 
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possibility of false confessions. 153 Accordingly, critics have argued that courts 
should impose rigorous procedural safeguards-such as videotaping all custodial 
interrogations-to ensure that defendants' rights are protected. 154 The Supreme 
Court has not done so, however. With the exception of the Miranda doctrine, 
which is commonly seen as a "spectacular failure," 155 the Court has imposed little 
regulation on confessions. 156 As a supposedly tough-on-crime state, it would make 
sense for Texas to follow the Supreme Court's approach and abdicate the 
regulation of confessions. Once again, however, Texas has done the opposite by 
imposing rigorous statutory rules to regulate confessions. 
Although the Supreme Court has long permitted oral confessions to be admitted 
so long as they are voluntary and comply with the Miranda doctrine, the Texas 
Code of Criminal Procedure heavily disfavors them. 157 And there are only two 
main exceptions to Texas's general statutory prohibition on oral confessions.158 
First, and in line with the recommendations of many scholars, oral confessions are 
permitted in Texas if the statement was electronically recorded and the defendant 
clearly waived his rights on the recording. 159 Second, an oral confession can be 
admitted against a defendant at trial if, after procuring the confession, police 
discover evidence that supports the confession. 160 This "found to be true" 
exception applies, for instance, if the defendant orally confessed to a burglary and 
the confession led officers to the location of the stolen property. 161 While not as 
protective as an electronic recording, the "found to be true" exception helps to 
153. See Keith A. Findley & MichaelS. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Visions in Criminal Cases, 
2006 WIS. L. REV. 291,335-36 (2006). 
154. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127 (2005) (arguing first for legislation, but then for court action as a fallback); see also 
Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1051, 1059 (2010) (noting that 
mandatory videolaping of confessions is on the rise). 
155. George C. Thomas, III, Mirandas Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. 
REv. 1091, 1092 (2003); see Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda: How Seibert and Palane Fail to 
"Save" Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. REv. 645 (2006). 
156. See Garrett, supra note 154, at 1110 ("Criminal procedure regulates solely the provision of Miranda 
warnings at the outset of a custodial interrogation and Ihe voluntariness of admissions of guilt. Having found the 
admission of guilt voluntary, a court does not assess the formation of a confession narrative, no matter how tainted 
or unreliable."). 
157. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.22, § 3 (West 2011) (allowing statements "made as a result of 
custodial interrogation" to be admissible in trial in only limited circumstances). 
I 58. In addition to the two exceptions discussed above, Texas courts are permitted to admit oral statements that 
were procured in other states in compliance with those states'law or oral statements procured by federal officials. 
See id. at § 8. 
159. See id. at§ 3(a). The Code also requires thai all relevant warnings can be heard on the recording, all 
material voices (i.e. the interrogating officers and the suspect) are identified on the recording, and a copy of the 
recording is produced to the defendant well in advance of trial. See id. 
160. See id. al § 3(c). 
161 . For examples of the "found to be true" exception, see Robert R. Barton, The Code Means What It Says: 
Revisiting the Admissibility of Corroborated Unwritten Custodial Statements, 26 TEX. TECH L. REv. 779, 799-805 
(1995). 
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prevent against wrongful confessions because the confession must be sufficiently 
accurate to lead police to further evidence of the crime. 
In addition to strongly favoring written confessions, the Texas Code also 
requires that Miranda warnings, plus an additional warning that the defendant has 
"the right to terminate the interview at any time," be provided to the suspect in 
writing. 162 Moreover, the suspect's waiver of those warnings must be recorded on 
the face of his written statement. 163 The Supreme Court of the United States has 
never required the Miranda warnings to be in writing, never specified that the 
suspect be advised of his "right to terminate the interview at any time," and never 
mandated that waiver be in writing on the face of the confession. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court recently issued a decision substantially weakening the waiver 
doctrine by putting the onus on the defendant to invoke his rights. 164 
Finally, and most dramatically different from Supreme Court precedent, the 
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure actually permits the jury to disregard a 
confession if it does not believe the confession was made voluntarily. As in other 
states, Texas judges rule on defendants' motions to suppress confessions. 165 
However, if a Texas judge refuses to suppress the confession and there is any 
evidence presented at trial from which the jury could conclude the confession was 
involuntary, the judge must instruct the jury not to consider the confession unless 
the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. 166 
For example, imagine that a defendant contends that an officer threatened to 
break his arm unless he confessed. The officer maintains that no such threat was 
made, and the trial judge, believing the officer, denies the suppression motion. In 
many courthouses outside of Texas, that would be the end of the matter and the 
evidence would be admissible. 167 In Texas, however, if the defendant is able to put 
his allegation before the jury, the defendant should have another chance to have the 
confession thrown out, this time by the jury. 168 
In practice, it is rare for juries to find confessions involuntary. 169 Nevertheless, 
the option to place the confession's admissibility before the jury, and effectively to 
162. See§ 2(a). 
163. See id. at§ 2(b). 
164. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
165. See § 6 ("In all cases where a question is raised as to the voluntariness of a statement of an accused, the 
court must make an independent finding in the absence of the jury .... "). 
166. See id. 
167. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 378 (1964) (noting the Massachusetts rule, which was similar to the 
Texas approach, differed from the "orthodox rule" under which "the judge himself solely and finally determines 
the voluntariness of the confession ... ");see also T. C. Williams, Voluntariness of Confession Admitted by Court 
as Question for Jury, 170 A.L.R. 567 (1947) (categorizing twelve states as leaving the issue of voluntariness 
solely for the court, twenty-four states as leaving the issue ultimately for the jury, and seven states as being in 
doubt). 
168. See§ 6. 
169. Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying 
Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REv. 465,470 (2005). 
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put the police department on trial, is an additional tactic available to defense 
attorneys. 
The Texas Code's detailed requirements for admitting confessions as evidence 
makes it more difficult for state prosecutors to utilize confessions than it is for 
federal prosecutors working across the street. As with other generous criminal 
procedure rules, the legislature has contemplated eliminating the statutory protec-
tions for confessions. 170 In 1977, the legislature considered a bill that would have 
made oral statements admissible in all cases. 171 Ultimately, the legislature rejected 
this sweeping change and instead authorized only a limited exception for recorded 
oral confessions. 172 Further bills to eliminate or scale back the oral confession rule 
were introduced in 1981, 1985, and 1987, with support of prosecutors from across 
the state, yet these efforts failed. 1 73 
E. The Legislature Has Refused to Authorize Sobriety Checkpoints 
Despite the fact that Texas has a serious problem with drunk driving-Texas had 
more than 1200 drunk-driving fatalities in 2010 and was ranked by MADD as the 
second worst state for DWis 174-law enforcement officers have not been permit-
ted to set up sobriety checkpoints for nearly two decades. 175 As explained below, 
the prohibition on sobriety checkpoints stems from a poorly reasoned Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals decision that the legislature could easily overrule. Yet, despite 
numerous bills having been introduced, the legislature has never acted. 
In the 1990 case of Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 176 the Supreme 
Court upheld the use of sobriety checkpoints under the special needs exception to 
the Fourth Amendment. 177 So long as the checkpoints are effective and operated 
with minimum intrusion, they do not violate the Fourth Amendment. 178 A few 
years after the Supreme Court's decision in Sitz, the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals ruled on the legality of sobriety checkpoints. 179 The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals held that the Fourth Amendment requires the legislature or 
another politically accountable body to specifically authorize sobriety checkpoints 
170. George E. Dix, Texas "Confession" Law and Oral Self-Incrimination Statements, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. I, 
10-11 (1989) [hereinafter Dix, Texas "Confession "] (describing some of the legislative history of the bill). 
171. See id. 
172. See id. at II. 
173. See id. at 11-14. 
174. See Texas, MADD, http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving/campaign/state-statsffexas.html (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2011). 
175. See Holt v. State, 887 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)(en bane) (holding sobriety checkpoints to be 
unconstitutional unless and until a politically accountable state body enacted constitutional guidelines for their 
use). 
176. 496 u.s. 444 (1990). 
177. /d. at 449-50, 455. 
178. See id. at 455. 
179. Holt, 887 S.W.2dat 19. 
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before they can be established 180 -a complete misreading of the Supreme Court's 
Sitz decision. 181 Because the Texas legislature had never explicitly authorized 
checkpoints, the Texas court reasoned, such checkpoints are prohibited. 182 
As a result of the Holt decision, Texas has become one of only ten states that 
forbid sobriety checkpoints.183 And the majority of those ten states prohibit 
checkpoints because their state constitutions require greater protection than the 
Fourth Amendment. 184 The Texas Constitution does not preclude checkpoints, 
however. A simple bill enacted by the legislature and signed by the Governor could 
authorize sobriety checkpoints in Texas. 185 Legislators have attempted to pass a 
bill authorizing sobriety checkpoints in almost every legislative session since the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' Holt decision. 186 Yet, despite the enormous 
drunk driving problem in Texas 187 and the repeated endorsement of law enforce-
ment organizations, 188 every sobriety checkpoint bill has been defeated. 189 
F. The Texas Rules for Denying Bail to Dangerous Defendants Are 
Confusing and Restrictive 
In addition to the evidentiary issues discussed above, Texas has pre-trial release 
rules that are favorable to criminal defendants. The Texas Constitution makes it 
180. /d. 
181. The Supreme Court never specified approval by a legislative body as a prerequisite to a valid sobriety 
checkpoint. On the ambiguities of the Holt decision, see GEORGE E. DIX & ROBERT 0. DAWSON, 40 TEXAS 
PRACfiCE, CRIMINAL PRACfiCE AND PROCEDURE § I 0.72 (2d ed. 200 I & Supp. 2009). 
182. Holt, 887 S.W.2d at 19. 
183. Those states are Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, Wiscon-
sin, and Wyoming. See Sobriety Checkpoints, MADD (2011), http://www.madd.org/lawsllaw-overview/ 
Sobriety_ Checkpoints_ Overview. pdf. 
184. See State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d 1057, 1063-64 (Idaho 1988); Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 
209, 224-25 (Mich. 1993); Ascher v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994); State v. 
Boyanovsky, 743 P.2d 711, 712 (Or. 1987); Pimental v. Dep't of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348, 1351-53 (R.I. 1989); 
City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 755 P.2d 775, 776 (Wash. 1988). 
185. See Holt, 887 S.W.2d at 19. 
186. See H.R. 169, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); S.B. 298, 8lst Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); S.B. 59, 80th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007); S.B. 233, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007); H.R. 253, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 
2007); H.R. SO, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005); H.R. 309, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005); S.B. 44, 78th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003); H.R. 226, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003); S.B. 398, 76th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999); 
H.R. 1927, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999); S.B. 499, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); S.B. 357, 74th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995); H.R. 263, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995); H.R. 950, 73rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1993). 
187. See MADD, supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
188. See, e.g., Guillermo Garcia, SAPD Proposals Win Council OK, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, May 2, 
2008, at 3b (noting that the Police Chief of San Antonio was "seeking the Legislature's support for several 
beefed-up DWI efforts, including random, roving sobriety checkpoints-a method that is limited under current 
state law"). 
189. See News Roundup, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEws, Nov. 28,2010, at B2 ("North Texas lawmakers plan to 
try again to introduce a sobriety checkpoints bill in the new legislative session. Similar legislation has failed 
before. The checkpoints have been banned since 1994."). 
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difficult for prosecutors to deny bail to dangerous defendants. 190 Not only does the 
state constitution impose a complicated set of rules that lawyers can easily 
misunderstand, but it also imposes a short window for prosecutors to produce live 
evidence in support of a motion to deny bail. 191 Additionally, bond amounts for 
many Texas defendants are considerably lower than the amounts imposed by 
jurisdictions outside of Texas. 192 In part because of these rules, many defendants 
who would be detained in advance of trial in other states are granted bail in Texas. 
The Texas Constitution does not permit judges to simply deny bail because the 
defendant committed a particularly egregious crime, is a clear threat to the 
community, or has a laundry list of prior convictions. 193 Rather, the judge must 
determine whether the defendant fits specifically into one of a handful of 
(complicated) categories provided by the Constitution. In short, the Texas Consti-
tution allows a defendant to be "no-bonded" when he is accused of committing (1) 
a felony and has two previous felony convictions; (2) a felony while out on bail for 
a pending felony; (3) a felony involving a deadly weapon, when he has a previous 
conviction for a felony; (4) a violent or sexual offense while under supervision 
such as probation; (5) a crime of family violence, which violates a condition of 
bail; or (6) a capital felony where proof is evident. 194 
As the long list of rules above indicates, the Texas bail rules are complicated. 
Anecdotally, prosecutors and defense attorneys would likely concede that many 
practicing lawyers and felony court judges-even those with considerable experi-
ence-simply do not understand the rules governing the denial of bail in Texas 
cases. And because prosecutors and judges sometimes do not understand the rules, 
they mistakenly fail to deny bail to defendants who fall within the statutory 
requirements. 
Additionally, even if judges properly deny bail, there is another trap for the 
unwary prosecutor. The Texas Constitution requires that judges hold a hearing on 
the denial of bail within seven calendar days of defendants' initial incarceration. 195 
As Professors Dix and Dawson have observed, the Court of Criminal Appeals 
treats the seven-day rule as jurisdictional and enforces it with "care and rigor." 196 
Accordingly, in cases where prosecutors and judges fail to initiate such a hearing 
190. See GEORGE E. DIX & ROBERT 0. DAWSON, 41 TEXAS PRACI"ICE, CRIMINAL PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 16.181 (2d ed. 2001) ("The provisions for denial of bail in certain noncapital cases, contained in article I, section 
II a of the Texas Constitution, are in many ways more specific and certainly are more procedurally complex than 
those for denial of bail in capital prosecutions."). 
191. See TEX. CONST. art. I,§ 1l(a). 
192. See, e.g., District Coun Bail Schedule, HARRIS CNTY. DIST. CT., http://www.justex.net/BaiiBondSchedule. 
aspx (last visited Dec. 31,201 I); see also infra note 199 (demonstrating Harris County's low rates, as compared 
by the author to rates in other jurisdictions). 
193. See D1x & DAwsoN, supra note 190, at § 16.12 ("Bail cannot, for example, be denied on the basis that a 
felony defendant is accused of numerous offenses."). 
194. See TEX. CONST. art. I,§§ 11-llc; TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 17.152 (West 2011). 
195. See TEX. CONST. art. I,§ II a. 
196. DIX & DAWSON, supra note 190, at§ 16.192. 
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and savvy defense lawyers lay low for seven days, the defendant must be granted 
bail. 197 
Moreover, when bail is available-which it is in most cases-the amount of 
money is surprisingly low. In Harris County-Texas's largest jurisdiction-the 
standard bail amount for a first degree felony is only $20,000.198 For non-capital 
murder cases, the presumptive bail amount is only $50,000. 199 Similarly low bail 
amounts are in place in Fort Worth200 and Dallas.201 Judges, of course, are free to 
increase bail beyond the standard amounts202 so long as they do not raise it 
impermissibly high?03 Nevertheless, it is not the least bit unusual for alleged 
murderers to be granted bail at fairly low rates in Texas, and remain free pending 
trial.204 And occasionally, murder defendants who have posted low bail amounts of 
$50,000,205 $35,000,206 or as low as $10,000207 decide to flee rather than show up 
for trial. 
By contrast, jurisdictions outside of Texas impose much tougher bail amounts. 
Many counties-including some in the more liberal state of California-deny bail 
outright to all murder defendants?08 In New Jersey, the statewide bail schedule 
sets the presumptive minimum bail for murder cases at $250,000, which is more 
than five times the presumptive amount in Houston?09 In Los Angeles County, 
197. See id. 
198. See HARRIS CNTY. DIST. CT., supra note 192. The Court of Criminal Appeals has largely declined to 
intervene in counties' use of bail schedules. See D1x & DAWSON, supra note 190, at§ 16.102. 
199. See HARRIS CNTY. DIST. CT., supra note 192. 
200. See TARRANT COUNTY CRIMINAL DISTR!Cf JUDGES RECOMMENDED BOND SCHEDULE (20 II) (on file with the 
author). 
20 l. See DALLAS COUNTY RECOMMENDED BOND SCHEDULE (2009) (on file with the author). 
202. See Brian Rogers, Pasadena Man Accused of Killing Stepdaughter Posts Bail: Woman Died Saving 
Mother from Attack, Husband Says, Hous. CHRON. (Aug. 18, 2008), http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/pasadena-
news/article/Pasadena-man-accused-of-killing-stepdaughter-1779454.php (explaining how judge raised murder 
defendant's bail from $50,000 to $100,000). 
203. The TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE states, quite ambiguously, that bail cannot be used as an 
"instrument of oppression." See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 17.15(2) (West 2011). 
204. See Renee C. Lee, Defendant Skips Out on Capital Murder Trial: Huntsville Man Was Freed on Bond 
Twice in 2006 Case, Hous. CHRON., May 9, 2008, at B I (quoting Montgomery County District Attorney as saying 
that "$100,000 bail is not unusual for a non-death penalty capital murder case"). 
205. See id. ("A Huntsville man who was charged with capital murder in 2006 and then released twice on 
[$50,000] bail ... is on the lam after not showing up for his trial."). 
206. See Susan Carroll, Elusive Justice: An Abuse of Freedom, Dozens of 1/legal Immigrants out on Bail 
Commit Another Crime or Vanish Before Trial, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 17,2008, at AI (fleeing while on $35,000 
bond). 
207. See Brian Rogers, Change Inspired by 1987 Homicide: Defendant Fled but Did Not Hide His Identity, 
Hous. CHRON., Apr. 26,2009, atA8 (fleeing after posting $10,000 bail in 1988 and not located until2009). 
208. See, e.g., CRIMINAL BAIL SCHEDULE FOR SEMINOLE COUNTY, FLORIDA, No. 08-03-2(A2) (2010) (on file 
with author) (prohibiting bail for any first degree felony punishable by life); SUPER. CT. OF CAL., CouNTY OF 
NEVADA FELONY BAIL SCHEDULE (on file with the author) (prohibiting bail in murder cases); TULARE COUNTY 
SUPERIOR COURT FELONY/MISDEMEANOR BAIL SCHEDULE (2009) (on file with author) (same). 
209. See Memorandum from PhillipS. Carchman, Admin. Dir. of the Courts, to Assignment Judges (May 12, 
2005) [hereinafter NEW JERSEY BoND SCHEDULE], http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/directive/criminal/dir_09 _05.pdf. 
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Califomia-ajurisdiction every bit as busy as Texas's largest cities-the presump-
tive bail amount for non-capital murder is $1,000,000.Z10 
The divergence is equally clear for felonies other than murder. For many first 
degree felonies-for instance, kidnapping, manslaughter, and sexual assault-
other states require hundreds of thousands of dollars for defendants to post bail,211 
compared to $20,000 in Houston212 or $25,000 in Fort Worth213 and Dallas.Z 14 To 
paint an even starker picture, consider that some California jurisdictions set the 
same presumptive bail amount for burglary cases and campaign finance violations 
that Texas cities use for murder cases.215 
In sum, many Texas defendants find it considerably easier to post bail than their 
counterparts in other states. Unlike the search and seizure and confession rules 
discussed above, Texas's bond rules result not from the state legislature's choices, 
but from the state constitution and from local bond schedules. Nevertheless, the 
fact remains that defendants seeking bail in Texas are in a far better situation than 
would be expected in a tough-on-crime state. 
G. Statutory Discovery Rules Are Far More Favorable to Defendants in 
Texas than Most Other Jurisdictions 
As a general matter, there is far less discovery in criminal cases than in civil 
matters. 216 Defendants have a limited constitutional guarantee to receive favorable 
and material evidence under the Brady doctrine, 217 but beyond that, the availability 
of discovery is almost entirely a creature of statute.Z 18 And while informal 
discovery is present and effective in most well-functioning criminal court-
houses,219 defendants' statutory rights to discovery remains important, and, in 
most states, quite limited. To the extent there is a national trend toward more 
discovery in criminal cases, it is actually a trend toward defendants being required 
210. See SUPER. Cr. OF CAL., Los ANGELES COUNTY, FELONY BAIL SCHEDULE 3 (2011) (on file with the author) . 
211 . See id.; see also NEW JERSEY BOND SCHEDULE, supra note 209. 
212. See HARRIS CNTY. DIST. Cr., supra note 192. 
213. See TARRANT COUNTY CRIMINAL DISTRICT JUDGES REcOMMENDED BOND SCHEDULE, supra note 200. 
214. See DALLAS CouNTY REcOMMENDED BoND ScHEDULE, supra note 201. 
215. See Los ANGELES CouNTY, supra note 210, at 3 ($50,000 for campaign violations); TULARE CoUNTY 
SUPERIOR CoURT FELONY/MISDEMEANOR BAIL SCHEDULE, supra note 208 ($50,000 for burglary). 
216. See John G. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 2097, 2146-50 
(2000). 
217. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (i963) (holding that "suppression . .. of evidence favorable to an 
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment"). 
218. But see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding state rules requiring defendants to provide 
notice and information to prosecution about their alibi defense). 
219. See John G. Douglass, Fatal A/traction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY 
L.J. 437, 457-62 (2001) (discussing informal discovery and noting that "[f]or the most part, the process works 
effectively"). 
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to produce information to the prosecution.220 Once again, however, Texas is 
different. Not only do Texas defendants have a statutory right to receive consider-
able discovery, but the Texas Code rejects most of the defendant disclosures 
adopted by other states over the last few decades. Additionally, Texas has detailed 
discovery obligations with which prosecutors must comply for evidence to be used 
at the sentencing phase of trials. These pro-defendant discovery rules are explained 
below. 
1. Texas Defendants Have Greater Statutory Rights to Discovery than 
Defendants in Federal Court and Many Other States 
Defendants' rights to statutory discovery vary widely by jurisdiction. As 
Professor Jenny Roberts has explained, 
Around one-third of the states have relatively broad discovery rules or statutes, 
modeled on American Bar Association standards. But about a dozen states 
follow the highly restrictive federal rule, which is premised in part on the idea 
that a defendant should not be entitled to witness names or statements for 
pretrial investigation, but rather only for cross-examination purposes should 
the case ever get to that stage. The remaining states fall between the two 
models.221 
The discovery divide among the states is best illustrated by the crucial question 
of witness lists. In the federal system and in some states, the defendant is not 
entitled to know the identity of the prosecution's witnesses until the jury has been 
swom.222 Prosecutors may, as a matter of courtesy, inform defense lawyers in 
advance, but there is nothing to prevent prosecutors from the Perry Mason moment 
in which the unknown witness walks through the courtroom doors. By contrast, 
about half of the states require prosecutors to provide not just witness names, but 
also their addresses and prior statements before trial. 223 
Texas falls on the more generous end of the scale. Courts have interpreted the 
Texas Code to require224 the State to disclose "a list of witnesses it intends to use at 
220. See Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tzlting the Adversarial Balance, 74 CAL. L. REv. 
1567, 1569 (1986) ("Beginning early in the 1970's, revolutionary expansion occurred in criminal discovery by the 
prosecution against the defense."). 
221. Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and 
Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 1099 (2004). 
222. See Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006 
WIS. L. REv. 541, 578-79. 
223. See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal 
Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1585, 1623 (2005). 
224. While courts regularly order the disclosure of witness lists, at least two commentators caution that the 
word "require" may be too strong. As Professors Dix and Dawson have observed, "the appellate case law contains 
no case in which a trial judge's refusal to require the state to provide a complete witness list is held reversible 
error." GEORGE E. DIX & ROBERT 0. DAWSON, 42 TExAs PRACilCE, CRIMINAL PRACilCE AND PROCEDURE § 22.171 (200 I). 
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trjal, photographs, defendant's written statements, letters, accounts, and other 
evidence material to any matter in the case.'m5 While Texas is not the single most 
generous state in terms of discovery, it is certainly more generous in providing 
information to criminal defendants than many states and the federal system. 
Moreover, as discussed below, Texas is among a dwindling minority of states that 
prevents prosecutors from discovering valuable information from defendants in 
advance of trial. 
2. Despite a National Trend Toward Requiring Disclosure by Defendants, 
Texas Requires Defendants to Produce Almost Nothing in Advance of Trial 
Over the last few decades, states have imposed reciprocity requirements that 
force defendants to disclose witness lists and preview their defense theory in 
exchange for receiving certain discovery from the government.226 And many states 
go even further by giving prosecutors an independent right to discover information 
from the defense?27 State statutes across the country permit prosecutors to 
discover information about the defendant's alibi, statements by defense witnesses, 
expert reports, tangible objects and a slew of other information. 228 
As noted, Texas prosecutors must turn over witness lists and other materials to 
defendants in advance of trial. 229 Yet, these prosecutors have no reciprocal right to 
receive such discovery from defendants. Texas judges lack statutory authority to 
force defendants to produce any information about fact witnesses. 230 As two noted 
commentators have remarked, "[t]here is universal agreement that trial judges lack 
authority to compel the defense to provide the State with its witness list."231 
While there is good reason not to impose discovery obligations on defen-
dants,232 it is clear that such a firm stance handicaps the government's efforts to 
convict defendants. Prosecutors must sometimes "fly blind" at trial and during plea 
bargaining because they have no idea who the defense might call and what theory 
of the case might be put forward. 233 
225. Henricks v. State, 293 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing TEX. CoDE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
39.14 (West 2011)). Although very difficult to obtain, Texas defendants may also seek permission to take 
depositions of prosecution witnesses. See TEx. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 39.02 (West 2005). 
226. See Mosteller, supra note 220, at 1580. 
227. See id. at 1580-81. 
228. See id. at 1579-82. 
229. See Brown, supra note 223, at 1623. 
230. Under the Texas Code, judges may, but need not, require the disclosure of the names and addresses of 
expert witnesses. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 39.14(b). Defendants who wish to offer evidence of the 
insanity defense must provide notice of their intent to offer that evidence at least twenty days before trial. See id. 
at art. 46C.051 (West 2005). 
231. See Thornton v. State, 37 S.W.3d 490, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting DIX & 
DAWSON, supra note 190, at§ 22.81 (1995)) (internal quotation marks removed). 
232. For an argument against too much discovery from defendants, see generally Mosteller, supra note 220. 
233. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2463, 2531 
(2004). 
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Once again, the Texas legislature has been in a position to follow the national 
trend and adopt a pro-prosecution rule that permits some discovery from defen-
dants before trial, but it has not done so. Indeed, in 1999, the legislature made a 
very narrow change to the Texas discovery statute so that judges could, but were 
not obligated to, order defendants to disclose their expert witnesses prior to trial.234 
The legislature could have imposed additional burdens on defendants to disclose 
fact witnesses and to provide notice of alibi defenses (as many other states have 
done),235 but it declined to do so. 
3. Prosecutorial Disclosure of Extraneous Offenses for the Punishment Phase 
Is Required by the Code and Is Burdensome to Prosecutors 
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure also causes discovery headaches for 
prosecutors at the punishment phase of trials. At sentencing, judges and juries are 
called upon to consider not just the gravity of the offense committed, but the 
offender himself. To do so, the fact-finder looks beyond the instant crime and 
considers extraneous behavior, such as prior criminal convictions and bad acts that 
did not result in conviction?36 Under article 37.07 of the Texas Code, prosecutors 
must give advance notice of all extraneous offenses they plan to introduce at the 
punishment stage?37 Prosecutors must identify the nature of the act, the date when 
it happened, the county where it occurred, and the victim who was harmed.238 
Although disclosure of extraneous offenses seems simple in the abstract, it is 
actually burdensome to prosecutors. In many Texas counties, prosecutors are 
overburdened with huge caseloads and they struggle even to prepare their 
case-in-chief.239 Accordingly, prosecutors sometimes do not tum their attention to 
the punishment phase until the eve of trial, and often do not discover valuable 
extraneous offenses in time to give notice of the date, location, and victim of prior 
misconduct by the defendant.240 At that point, judges must exclude those extrane-
ous offenses from consideration.241 
For example, consider a hypothetical case in which a defendant has been 
indicted for fraudulently selling land she did not own to a poor immigrant named 
Maria. A few days before trial, Maria off-handedly mentions to the prosecutor that 
234. See Thornton, 37 S.W.3d at 493 (discussing the 1999 revision to TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 
39.14(b)). 
235. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text. 
236. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3(3)(g) (West 20 II). 
237. See id. Defense attorneys are required to request notice in order for this provision to be applicable, but 
most defense attorneys simply do so in a standard fotm discovery request in all of their cases. 
238. See id. 
239. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive 
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 261 (2011). 
240. See, e.g., James v. State, 47 S.W.3d 710 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (vacating punishment because prosecutor 
failed to provide notice of the date of extraneous sexual abuse allegations admitted into evidence at punishment 
stage). 
241. See id. 
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the defendant committed the same type of land fraud against three other victims 
who Maria knew only on a first-name basis. The prosecutor tries to get in touch 
with these other three victims but, because time is short, she is unable to contact 
them before trial begins. Without the victims' full names and the dates when they 
were defrauded, the prosecutor is unable to give proper notice of these extraneous 
offenses as required under the Texas Code. In the middle of trial, the prosecutor 
finally locates the other three victims and they all indicate they would testify that, 
just like Maria, they were tricked into paying for land that the defendant did not 
own. This evidence is certainly relevant at the punishment stage and would be 
quite helpful to the prosecutor in showing a pattern of misconduct by the 
defendant. Yet, the prosecutor likely will be prohibited from using this testimony 
because of lack of notice?42 (And, if the statute of limitations has passed, a 
stand-alone prosecution for the land fraud would be forbidden as well.) 
In the case outlined above, the Texas discovery rules would work an injustice by 
forbidding the fact-finder from considering relevant punishment evidence. On the 
other hand, there are surely cases where defendants would suffer unfairly if the 
rules allowed prosecutors to surprise them with extraneous offenses without 
adequate notice. While the optimal amount of notice is debatable, it is noteworthy 
that once again Texas has adopted a rule that is more favorable to defendants than 
is required. In fact, in requiring notice of extraneous offenses in non-capital cases, 
Texas has rejected its own notice rule for death penalty cases.243 Under the 
separate Texas statute governing capital murder cases, prosecutors are not required 
to give advance notice before introducing extraneous offenses at the punishment 
phase. 244 The legislature could easily apply this rule to non-capital cases, but has 
chosen not to do so. 
* * * 
In sum, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires prosecutors to provide 
defendants with considerable fact discovery as well as notice of extraneous 
offenses for the punishment stage, while receiving little discovery in return. The 
Texas Code thus advantages defendants by making the discovery process more 
burdensome for prosecutors. 
242. But see Edward L. Wilkinson, Punishment Evidence: Grunsfeld Ten Years Later, 35 Sr. MARY's L.J. 603, 
629,632 (2004) (noting that "the reasonableness of the State's notice turns on the facts and circumstances of each 
individual case" and indicating that "[ w ]hile notice as late as the Friday before trial beginning the following 
Monday has been held to be unreasonable, under other circumstances notice while trial is underway has been held 
to be 'reasonable'"). 
243. See Janet Morrow & Robert Morrow, In a Narrow Grave: Texas Punishment Law in Capital Murder 
Cases, 43 S. TEX. L. REv. 979, 1095 (2002) ("A capital defendant is not entitled to notice by statute that the State 
intends to offer evidence of an unadjudicated extraneous offense against him at punishment, even though Texas 
statutes require such notice to the defendant in a non-capital case."). 
244. See id. 
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H. Texas Defendants in All Criminal Cases-Including Traffic 
Violations-Are Entitled to a Jury Trial and Can Even 
Request That the Jury Decide Their Sentence 
61 
The Supreme Court of the United States has long made clear that criminal 
defendants do not have a Sixth Amendment right to a jury in all criminal cases ?45 
Rather, defendants must be charged with an offense that carries more than six 
months' incarceration in order to qualify for a jury trial under the federal 
Constitution.246 Additionally, with the exception of death penalty cases, the 
Supreme Court has never required any jury involvement at the sentencing phase of 
trial.247 These two limitations on the jury trial right ostensibly benefit the 
prosecution.Z48 Texas has rejected both rules, however. 
I. Defendants in All Cases-Even Those Charged with Running a Stop 
Sign-Can Demand a Jury Trial in Texas 
Although most states continue to afford a jury trial right in all criminal cases 
carrying jail time, nine states have accepted the Supreme Court's invitation and 
eliminated the requirement of a jury trial for low-level misdemeanors carrying six 
months or less incarceration.249 In these states, defendants charged with drunk 
driving, marijuana possession, and other similarly minor offenses can be sentenced 
to jail time without the benefit of a jury. Some states that cannot take this approach 
(because their state constitutions require jury trials in all criminal cases) have 
managed to eliminate juries for the lowest level offenses by classifying them as 
infractions, rather than conventional crimes?50 
245. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, IS9-60 (1968) (requiring jury trial only in non-petty criminal 
cases). 
246. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) ("[N)o offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the 
right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized."); Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary 
Men, supra note 76, at 10 & n.60. 
247. On the history of jury sentencing, see Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 311 (2003). 
248. As Professor Andrew Leipold has documented, defense lawyers have a strong preference for juries. See 
Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. IS I, 158-63 (2005). The 
saying goes that a guilty defendant tries his luck with the jury, while an innocent defendant goes to the judge. See 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, ISO! (1999) ("If juries 
are less accurate guilt determiners than judges, innocent defendants will choose to be tried by judges rather than 
run the risk of jury mistake, while guilty defendants will choose to be tried by juries, hoping for a mistake. The 
acquittal rate should therefore be higher in bench trials-and it is."). 
249. See Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men, supra note 76, at 10 & n.61 (enumerating the states that have taken 
this approach). 
2SO. See. e.g., Mitchell v. Super. Ct., 783 P.2d 731, 738 (Cal. 1989) ("In contrast to the federal jury trial 
guaranty which draws a distinction between 'serious' and 'petty' criminal offenses and requires a jury trial only 
for those offenses which fall into the 'serious' category, the right to trial by jury embodied in the California 
Constitution extends to so-called 'petty' as well as to 'serious' criminal offenses, i.e., to all misdemeanors as well 
as to all felonies. Under the California Constitution, only infractions not punishable by imprisonment(§ 19c) are 
not within the jury trial guaranty."); see also MODEL PENAL CoDE § 1.04(S) (setting forth a category of 
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In Texas, the right to a jury trial remains sacrosanct.251 Much like the Sixth 
Amendment, the Texas Constitution specifies that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions 
the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury"252 ; and over thirty 
years ago, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the Supreme Court's 
invitation to eliminate jury trials in minor cases.253 Moreover, the Texas Penal 
Code classifies even the most minor offenses-such as a traffic ticket for running a 
stop sign or driving without insurance-as criminal offenses, not non-criminal 
infractions.254 While these tickets carry only a fine and no jail time, they are 
classified as Class C misdemeanors in the Texas Penal Code. 255 Thus, when a 
defendant is ticketed for a traffic offense, she has a right to a jury trial. 256 
Texas's expansive jury trial right is not simply a paper guarantee with no 
real-world significance. Every day, Texas juries are empanelled to handle traffic 
cases and other low-level offenses. For instance, on November 4, 20 I 0, the author, 
along with thirty-two other people, was called for jury duty in justice of the peace 
court in Harris County, Texas to adjudicate a case where the defendant was charged 
with running a stop sign. After voir dire, the court empanelled a six-person jury to 
hear testimony. The defendant was ultimately convicted. 
In another similarly low stakes case, a Harris County defendant was charged 
with catching a fish that was a few inches too small-a Class C misdemeanor in 
Texas carrying a maximum fine of $500?57 Rather than pay the fine (which the 
prosecutor offered to knock down to $50), the defendant insisted on having a trial 
by jury.258 The court summoned forty prospective jurors and empanelled a 
six-person jury.Z59 After the jury acquitted the defendant, one juror remarked that 
he thought the defendant was guilty, but voted to acquit because "it was a waste of 
everyone's time for the prosecutor to drag everyone into court over a fish."260 
"violations" which do not constitute a crime and which "shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage 
based on conviction of a criminal offense"). 
251. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
252. !d. 
253. See Franklin v. State, 576 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). 
254. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.41 (West 2009) ("[A)ny conviction not obtained from a prosecution 
under this code shall be classified as follows ... 'Class C misdemeanor' if the offense is punishable by fine 
only."). 
255. See id. at § 12.23 (West 1994) ("An individual adjudged guilty of a Class C misdemeanor shall be 
punished by a fine not to exceed $500."). 
256. In fact, the Texas jury trial right is so expansive that it permits defendants convicted of Class C 
misdemeanors in justice of the peace court to appeal the conviction to county court and receive a trial de novo. See 
TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 4.08 (West 2011). 
257. See Interview with Danny Lacayo, Assistant Dist. Att'y, Harris Cnty. Dist. Attorney's Office (Jan. 24, 
201 0) (on file with author). 
258. Seeid. 
259. See id. 
260. See id. 
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As the under-sized fish case demonstrates, Texas jurors will sometimes nullify 
the prosecution of factually guilty defendants because they blame the prosecution 
for wasting their time (even though it was the defendant, not the prosecutor, who 
invoked the jury trial). Regardless of whether one believes expansive jury trial 
rights are good or bad public policy,261 it seems clear that the policy makes it 
harder for prosecutors to convict some defendants. 
2. Criminal Defendants Have the Option to Choose Between the Jury and 
Judge for Sentencing, Allowing Them to Pick Whomever They Think Will Be 
Less Punitive 
In the federal system and almost all of the states, judges are exclusively 
responsible for sentencing in non-capital cases?62 The Texas framework is very 
different, however. In Texas, defendants have the exclusive option, prior to trial, to 
choose whether to be sentenced by the judge or the jury.Z63 So long as the 
defendant does not try to change his election after trial has begun, prosecutors have 
no authority to impede a defendant's choice?64 This approach is so unique-and 
so favorable to criminal defendants-that only one other state in the nation has 
adopted it.265 As with the search and seizure and confession rules discussed above, 
this unique pro-defendant rule is a statutory right that could easily be overruled by 
the legislature.266 
The option for jury sentencing is very favorable to Texas criminal defendants. 
Because judges are repeat players in the criminal justice system and sentence 
hundreds of defendants per year, it is well known in the courthouse which judges 
are tough and which are lenient.267 And because Texas is an indeterminate 
sentencing state with extremely broad sentencing ranges, the possible difference 
261. I have previously argued that guaranteeing jury trials for low-level offenses is bad public policy. See 
Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men, supra note 76. 
262. See Nancy J. King & Roosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three State Survey, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 885, 886 (2004) (explaining that Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia 
allow jury sentencing). 
263. See TEX. CooE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.07 § 2(b) (West 2011). 
264. See id. The only time a defendant needs permission from the prosecution to change his election from jury 
to judge is if he has elected jury sentencing before the start of trial and has subsequently changed his mind. See id. 
265. Missouri is the only state to adopt the Texas framework. See Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 557.036(4)(1) (West 2003). 
A few other states have adopted jury sentencing, but they give prosecutors more input on the decision to waive the 
jury. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DuKE L.J. 951, 1006 (2003) (explaining that in 
Arkansas, the defendant needs the consent of the prosecution to waive jury sentencing, and that in Oklahoma and 
Virginia, the defendant can only waive jury sentencing with the consent of the prosecutor and the judge); 
Jontcheva, supra note 247, at 376-77 ("Kentucky allows waivers of jury sentencing only with the assent of the 
prosecution."). 
266. As one Texas appellate court explained, "[a] defendant in a criminal case has no constitutional right to 
have a jury assess punishment. ... He does, however, have a statutory right to have the jury assess punishment." 
Sterry v. State, 959 S.W.2d 249,257 (Tex: App. 1997) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
267. See Gershowitz, /2 Unnecessary Men, supra note 76, at 36-37. 
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between the punishment a judge or jury might impose is enormous.268 
If judge A is reputed to be extremely tough, defendants in that court typically 
elect to have the jury assess punishment because they have better odds of a lighter 
sentence. If judge B is regarded as lenient, defendants almost always elect to have 
the judge, not the jury, impose punishment.269 Consider a real-world example from 
Harris County, Texas. From 2005 to 2008, Judge Devon Anderson presided over 
the I 77th District Court and was regarded as a tough sentencing judge. 270 
Defendants who proceeded to trial were thought to regularly elect sentencing by 
the jury because they believed they would receive a lighter sentence. In 2008, 
Kevin Fine, a defense attorney who campaigned on the idea that his prior problems 
with drug addiction would better enable him to deal with many felony defendants, 
unseated Judge Anderson.271 Not surprisingly, in the two years since Judge Fine 
has taken the bench, a majority of defendants in the I 77th District Court are now 
expected to decline jury sentencing and elect to be sentenced by Judge Fine. 
This is not to say that Texas prosecutors always hate the idea of the defendant 
having a choice between jury and judge sentencing. As prosecutors and defense 
attorneys well know, jury sentencing is a wild card, and sometimes defendants 
make the wrong choice. Many prosecutors have war stories in which they feared a 
jury would impose a light sentence, only to have the jury impose a far tougher 
sentence than the judge likely would have handed down. Those stories are the 
exception, however. In most .cases, when defendants have basic background 
information about the presiding judge and are presented with the option to choose 
between the judge and the jury, the defendants choose the opposite of what the 
prosecution would prefer. And the sentence imposed is typically lighter than what 
prosecutors would have expected from the other body. 
Of course, I do not want to suggest that the lighter sentences defendants 
sometimes receive by having the option of choosing between judges and juries is 
always a bad thing. In some instances, the option of jury sentencing may serve as a 
check against overly punitive judges. My point is that the sentencing choice 
268. For instance, in a first degree felony case, a judge could choose to impose ten years while a jury might opt 
to give the defendant thirty years or more. See TEX. PENAL CoDE § 12.32 (West 2009) (carrying a range of five to 
ninety-nine years for first degree felonies) . In a second degree felony, the judge could choose to impose the 
maximum of twenty years, while the jury could impose the minimum sentence of two years. See id. at § 12.33 
(West 2009) (carrying a range of two to twenty years for second degree felonies). 
269. To put the matter metaphorically, although Texas defendants do not get two bites at the sentencing apple, 
they do have the opportunity to look carefully at one of the apples before deciding which one to bite into. 
270. See The I 77th District Coun Judicial Race, LIFE HARRIS CoUNTY CRIM. JusT. CENTER, (Oct. I, 2008, 
II :32 PM), http://harriscountycriminaljustice.blogspot.com/2008110/177th-district·court-judicial-race.html (dis-
cussing Judge Anderson, in blog maintained by former Assistant District Attorney and current defense attorney, 
and noting that she was a "tough judge"). 
271. See Brian Rogers, Real-Life Experience: With the "Four-Horsemen of Addiction" Behind Him, Newly 
Elected Judge Says He's Ready, Hous. CHRON. (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/articlel 
New-judge-says-his-former-addiction-can-help-154056l.php. 
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afforded to Texas defendants is a procedural rule that prosecutors almost uniformly 
dislike and that every other state in the nation, save one, has rejected.272 
* * * 
The discussion in Part ll.A through II.H highlights a number of areas in which 
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and the Texas Constitution guarantee 
significant rights to Texas defendants that they would not receive under the federal 
Constitution. These protections, while the most significant, are in no way the only 
pro-defendant guarantees provided to Texas defendants. The Texas Code of 
Criminal Procedure also imposes more rigorous requirements for conducting 
warrantless arrests,273 tighter restrictions on the execution of search warrants,274 a 
broader right to counsel at probation revocation hearings, 275 and a variety of other 
safeguards not compelled by the federal Constitution. 
It is important to be modest in stating the limits of my argument. I am not 
arguing that Texas has the (or even one of the) most pro-defendant codes of 
criminal procedure in the nation. I am also not arguing that the criminal procedure 
protections afforded by the Texas Code are bad public policy. Rather, I am simply 
making the descriptive observation that Texas is not nearly as tough as its 
reputation suggests when it comes to criminal procedure. 
III. WHY Is TEXAS ToUGH ON CRIME, BUT SoFT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE? 
Having demonstrated that Texas can be simultaneously tough on crime and 
generous in its statutory criminal procedure protections, the lingering question is 
"why?" As explained below, there are a number of possible explanations as to why 
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure may be protective of criminal defendants. 
To be clear at the outset, I do not attempt to offer a unifying theory that reconciles 
all of Texas's procedural rules with all of its tough-on-crime policies. It may very 
well be impossible, for instance, to explain why the nation's most prolific user of 
capital punishment is the only state that rejects the inevitable discovery doctrine by 
statute. What I offer below is instead a series of starting points to explain the Texas 
dichotomy. 
A. There Is No Inconsistency Between Being Tough on Crime and 
Generous on Criminal Procedure 
The first explanation for the contradiction between being tough on crime and 
generous on criminal procedure is that there is in fact no contradiction. Texas could 
272. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
273. See TEX. CooECRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 14.01-06 (West 2011). 
274. See id. at art. 18.06 (West 1981) (setting time limit of three days, not counting day of issuance or day of 
execution). 
275. See Ex parte Shivers, 501 S.W.2d 898, 900-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (interpreting TEX. CoDE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 3 (West 1965)). 
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choose to give defendants robust procedural protections before finding them 
guilty, but thereafter punish them harshly for violation of the social compact. Put 
differently, it is logical to punish harshly when we have afforded defendants 
vigorous procedural protections and are sure of their guilt. This theory might 
explain why Texas is willing to endure inefficient practices such as jury trials for 
traffic infractions and onerous rules for confessions.276 It also could explain why 
the Texas Constitution offers only limited opportunities to deny bail to defendants 
who have not yet been convicted. 277 And the theory seems particularly well-suited 
to Texans who see their state not simply as a location but as a way of life.278 An 
offense against the State of Texas and its citizens-if we are sure you committed 
it-is a great sin deserving of harsh punishment given how exceptional the state is 
in the eyes of its citizens. 
On a very general level, the social compact theory seems to make sense. But the 
explanation breaks down when applied to certain situations. For instance, while 
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure offers run-of-the-mill defendants a series of 
robust protections, the Texas Code certainly does not go out of its way to protect 
capital defendants from unjust death sentences.Z79 The Texas death penalty statute 
is the most pro-prosecution capital punishment scheme in the nation, and has long 
been criticized for offering insufficient procedural protection.Z8° For decades, 
Texas juries have sentenced inmates to death after inadequate trials and substan-
dard representation.281 Texas's death penalty record therefore makes it difficult to 
assert that Texas criminal law and procedure is founded on an idea of giving all 
criminal defendants every benefit of the doubt before punishing them harshly. The 
social compact argument is also unconvincing when we consider how Texas has 
occasionally fought payment to exonerated individuals who are entitled to compen-
sation under the state's wrongful conviction statute.Z82 In short, while there may be 
something to the idea that Texas's toughness follows directly from vigorously 
protecting procedural rights, the argument has limitations. 
276. See supra Parts II .H & II.D. 
277. See supra Part II. F. 
278. See J.A. Burkhart, Texas, Texans, and Texanism , 9 ANTIOCH REv. 316, 318 (1949). 
279. See supra Part I. A. 
280. See Morrow & Morrow, supra note 243, at 1002. For a discussion of the legal questions raised by the 
statute, see CarolS. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations, Implementation of the Death Penalty in 
"Executing " Versus "Symbolic" States in the United States, 84 TEx. L. REV. 1869, 1890-95 (2006). 
281. See, e.g. , DAVID R. Dow, EXECUTED ON A TECHNICALITY: LETHAL INJUSTICE ON AMERICA'S DEATH Row 
(2005). 
282. See, e.g., Harvey Rice, State Rejects Compensation for Wrongly Convicted Man, Hous. CHRON. (Feb. 14, 
20 II), ht!p://www.chron.com/default/article/State-denies-compensation-to-wrongly-convicted-man-1692982.php 
(refusing to pay $1.4 million to man wrongfully on death row for eighteen years because the judge's order 
dismissing the charges did not specifically say the inmate was innocent). 
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B. Texas's Distrust of Government Power, Its Penchant for Private Ordering, 
and Its Emphasis on Individual Liberty May Explain Criminal 
Procedure Guarantees and Tough Punishments 
67 
A second, and slightly more persuasive, argument centers around Texas's 
engrained gun culture283 and its disdain for excessive government interference.284 
Texans believe strongly in gun ownership and the concomitant idea of private 
ordering. They have no problem with punishing offenders harshly and indeed, 
Texas has a long history of lynching and vigilante justice.Z85 But when it comes to 
government power, Texas has historically been suspicious.286 While the Texas 
Rangers have been revered law enforcement figures for over a century, 287 Texans 
by and large remain skeptical of anything that might be seen as encroaching on 
individual liberties. This might explain why Texas is unwilling to accept an 
inevitable discovery exception that excuses illegal conduct by law enforcement 
officers,288 a good faith exception allowing for warrants lacking probable cause,289 
or sobriety checkpoints that give police wide authority to stop anyone without 
suspicion. 290 
Texas's concern about governmental power is in contrast to the deference shown 
to law enforcement by other states.Z91 To be sure, politicians in other states and in 
Congress do occasionally enact pro-defendant criminal procedure protections. Yet, 
283. See The Future Is Texas, ECONOMIST (Dec. 21, 2002), http://www.economist.com/node/1487487 ("Texas 
was tamed by gun-wielding cowboys and remains thoroughly marinated in gun culture."). On Texas gun laws, see 
Riley C. Massey, Bull's Eye: How the 8/st Texas Legislature Nearly Got It Right on Campus Carry, and the 82nd 
Should Still Hit the X- Ring, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 199,202-05 (2011); Robert G. Newman, A Farewell to 
Arms?-AnAnalysis of Texas Handgun Control Law, 13 ST. MARY's L.J. 601 (1982). 
284. See WILLIAM P. RUGER & JASON SORENS, GEO. MASON U., MERCATUS CTR., FREEDOM IN THE 50 STATES: 
AN INDEX OF PERSONAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM 9-10 (2009), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/publication/ 
Freedom_in_the_50_States.pdf (ranking Texas fifth nationally with respect to fiscal policy, regulation, and 
paternalism). To name but two prominent anecdotal examples, Texas is home to libertarian hero Ron Paul and has 
been at the forefront of electricity deregulation. 
285. See PERKINSON, supra note 46, at 142-43. 
286. See RANDOLPH B. CAMPBELL, GONE TO TEXAS: A HISTORY OF THE LONE STAR STATE 4 71 (2003) (discussing 
Texas's distinctiveness and explaining that it has "developed outsized emphasis on many of the qualities and 
characteristics regarded as being especially American-a fierce devotion to personal liberty, rampant individual-
ism, and admiration for the superrich, for example"); see also id. at 316 (noting that Democrats in charge of state 
government in the late 1800s "offered the least government possible--one that did what was necessary to protect 
property and preserve law and order and otherwise kept spending and taxing to a bare minimum"); id. at 382-92 
(describing skepticism of Texans toward big-government New Deal programs). 
287. See generally MIKE Cox, TIME OF THE RANGERS: FROM 1900TOTHE PRESENT (2009). 
288. See supra Part Il.A. 
289. See supra Part II. C. 
290. See, e.g., Larry Copeland, Drunk Drivers Push Limits: Hard-Core Offenders Prompt Zero Tolerance, 
USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 2010, at 3A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-12-08-drunken08_ 
ST_N.htm (noting that efforts to establish sobriety checkpoints in Texas have failed because of resistance from 
"drunks, people who make money off of drunks and civil libertarians"). 
291. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,378-79 
(1974) ("Legislatures have not been, are not now, and are not likely to become sensitive to the concern of 
protecting persons under investigation by the police."). 
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·as Professor Craig Lerner has shown, this often comes from self-interest or cases 
where politicians have had personal encounters with law enforcement.292 Texas 
politicians may not fit this mold, however, because they represent a more 
libertarian electorate that harbors a greater distrust of police power?93 Thus, where 
politicians in other states might be unwilling to vote for criminal procedure 
protections that would be seen as pro-defendant, Texas politicians may be willing 
to do so because the vote would be seen as pro-individual liberty. 
C. Longstanding Statutory Protections and Short Legislative Sessions May Keep 
Pro-Defendant Rules on the Books That Would Otherwise Be Rejected 
A third explanation combines the age of Texas's statutory protections with the 
very busy and very short legislative sessions in Texas. Some of Texas's pro-
defendant criminal procedure protections were codified a century ago, before the 
politicization of criminal justice issues.294 And while Texas legislators might reap 
political dividends by repealing these protections today, they simply lack the time 
to do so because of Texas's brief legislative session. The Texas legislature meets 
for only a few months every two years295 and there is little time for non-essential 
bills.296 Hence, old laws remain unchanged unless there is an enormous ground-
swell for revision. 
For example, the prohibition on oral confessions was added to the Texas Code in 
1907.297 There is no definitive explanation for what led to its enactment a century 
ago, 298 but it is clearly unpopular and ripe for deletion from the Code today. 299 
Although the legislature has considered repealing the protection a few times in the 
past, most legislative efforts have not made it out of committee.300 
292. Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the "American Criminal Class": Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the 
Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L REV. 599. As the saying goes, "if a conservative is a liberal who's been 
mugged, then a liberal would seem to be a conservative who's been indicted." See id. at 603-04. 
293. See CAMPBELL, supra note 286, at 316. 
294. Criminal justice issues did not become a major electoral focus until the 1960s. See Aya Gruber, A 
Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L REv. I, 39-40 (20 I 0). 
295. See TEx. CONST. art. 3, §§ 5(a}, 24 (limiting the legislative session to 140 days every 2 years). 
296. See, e.g., Editorial, Our Tum; Don't Let Technicalities Torpedo the Worthy Bills, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, 
May 25, 2007, at 8B ('The Texas Legislature meets for five months every two years. That's precious little time to 
take care of state business."). 
297. See Act of Aprill6, 1907, ch. 68, 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws 219; see also Dix, Texas "Confession", supra note 
170, at 7. 
298. Scholars cite a case in which a sheriff claimed a prisoner had orally confessed to murder, but it was later 
discovered that the prisoner only spoke Swedish, which the sheriff clearly did not speak. See Dix, Texas 
"Confession", supra note 170, at 8. As Professor Dix has explained, "(w]hether such a case ever occurred and, if 
so, whether it was the motivating factor for the oral confession rule is uncertain." /d. 
299. See id. at 4 (recounting outraged reaction when a high-profile murder case was overturned due to the oral 
confession rule). 
300. See id. at 13-14. 
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The same logic helps to explain why the Code's restrictive good faith exception 
and its private actor exclusionary rule have not been jettisoned.301 Individual 
legislators have introduced legislation to abolish those protections, but the efforts 
have never proceeded very far. 302 For example, in 1997, a bill with the sole 
purpose of eliminating the exclusionary rule for evidence seized illegally by 
private actors died in committee a month after being introduced.303 In 1999, a 
similar bill fared even worse, never even receiving a sub-committee hearing.304 
Multiple bills to expand Texas's narrow good faith exception have likewise never 
been reported out of subcornmittee.305 
The explanatory power of the "old rule, busy legislature" theory is limited, 
however. Texas is not the only state with a busy legislature, and Texas politicians 
know just as well as their colleagues in other states that being tough on crime 
(including eliminating unpopular protections for unpopular defendants) sells well 
at the ballot box.306 In short, the theory that limited legislative time preserves 
pro-defendant rules likely explains why less salient criminal procedure protections 
have not come under attack. But the theory, by itself, is insufficient to explain the 
continued existence of the most valuable procedural protections (such as the 
statutory confession rules) guaranteed in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 
D. Being Tough on Crime May Provide Cover for Being Generous on 
Criminal Procedure 
A fourth explanation is that Texas's well-known reputation for being tough on 
crime eliminates or at least reduces pressure on Texas legislators to curb criminal-
procedural protections. Under this explanation, the harsh punishments imposed in 
Texas leads to its citizens either: (1) wrongly assuming that the state is also stingy 
on criminal procedure protections for defendants; or (2) not being troubled by any 
beneficial procedural protections because of the sheer magnitude of punishment 
for those who are convicted. Under either theory, there is less public outrage about 
pro-defendant protections in Texas than in other states, and less pressure on Texas 
politicians to eliminate those statutory guarantees. 
Once again, there is likely some truth to this argument. Very few citizens 
(whether from Texas or elsewhere) recognize that the Texas Code of Criminal 
30 I. See supra Parts Il.B & II.C. 
302. See H.R. 2281, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997). 
303. See id. 
304. See H.R. 1320, 76th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1999). 
305. See H.R. 1578, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007); H.R. 1365, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); H.R. 
2047, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1995). 
306. See Gruber, supra note 294, at 60. Moreover, by eliminating obstacles to convictions, politicians increase 
the number of felons. The disenfranchisement of these felons in tum reduces the number of progressive voters 
who might vote against sitting conservative politicians. See id. ("Supporting crime control initiatives is especially 
rewarding for conservative politicians because increasing felony convictions leads to the disenfranchisement of 
those who, if they chose to vote, would likely vote for progressive candidates and policies."). 
HeinOnline  -- 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 70 2012
70 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:31 
Procedure contains numerous pro-defendant guarantees. And to the extent that 
observers are aware of pro-defendant rules, they may wrongly attribute them to 
court decisions, rather than blame the legislature for them. 307 
It is important not to take this explanation too far, however. As I explained in 
Part I, Texas is not as tough on crime as it appears. Defendants often receive the 
lower end of huge sentencing ranges, 308 and when tough sentences are meted out, 
they are often reduced by parole.309 More to the point, when defendants receive 
lighter than expected sentences310 or when criminal cases fall apart because of 
procedural problems (such as illegal searches311 or invalid confessions312), the 
news media is all too happy to highlight those cases.313 Similar news stories 
abound when accused criminals are granted bail and subsequently flee or commit 
new crimes?14 With media attention brought to bear, public backlash is inevitable. 
Texas politicians, just like their counterparts throughout the nation, therefore 
campaign as being tough on crime.315 Once elected, politicians who want to 
bolster their reputations (and be re-elected) should seemingly look to statutory 
criminal procedure guarantees as low-hanging fruit to be eliminated. And, in fact, 
individual legislators have unsuccessfully moved to scale back many of the 
pro-defendant statutory rules discussed in Part II. 316 
At bottom, Texas reputation for being tough-on-crime likely staves off some 
public resentment toward favorable criminal procedure guarantees. But, by itself, 
the perception of Texas's punitiveness is likely insufficient to explain its favorable 
Code of Criminal Procedure. 
*** 
In the end, there is likely some truth to all four explanations discussed above. 
Protective criminal procedure protections are not necessarily inconsistent with 
307. Popular (though not necessarily accurate) criticism of the criminal justice system almost universally lays 
blame on "activist judges" rather than legislative decisions. See, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: How THE 
SUPREME COURT Is DESTROYING AMERICA (2005). 
308. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text. 
309. See supra notes 63-<i7 and accompanying text. 
310. See Richard Stewart, Sentence Angers Victims' Family: Brazoria County Jury Gives Driver 4 Years in 
Prison for 2 DWI Deaths, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 30, 2008, at 82 (describing disappointment of victim and 
prosecutors with "very light" sentence). 
311. See, e.g., Tanya Eiserer, Prosecutors Seek Dismissal of Drug-Case Charges: Judge Throws Out Evidence; 
Police Unit Already Under Review, DALL. MORNING NEws, Mar. 17,2009, at 38 (suppressing search premised on 
consent because police threatened to incarcerate suspect's wife and place his child with protective services). 
312. See, e.g., Amy Green, Judge Tosses Out Nowak Evidence: Impact on the Ex-Astronauts Case Is Unknown 
After the Ruling She Was Misled by Police, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 3, 2007, at A3. 
313. See supra notes 277-79. 
314. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text. 
315. See, e.g., Ian McCann, Challenger Calls Out Madden on Ethics: Incumbent Dismisses Allegations, Says 
Cole Inexperienced, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Feb. 28, 2008, at I B (noting that challenger asserted his opponent 
was "soft on crime"). 
316. See supra notes 127-28, 138, 156-58, 167, 212-13 and accompanying text. 
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punishing convicted defendants harshly. And Texas's historical distrust of govern-
mental power may explain why the Texas Code makes it easier to suppress 
searches and confessions than other states. To the extent there is public support for 
eliminating some pro-defendant rules of procedure, entropy and a short legislative 
session may keep those protections on the books. And perhaps more so than in 
other states, the universal recognition that Texas is tough on crime may limit public 
pressure to roll back criminal procedure protections. 
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to punishing convicted defendants, Texas Toughness317 is no 
myth. Texas is the most prolific user of capital punishment, and it is a national 
leader in incarceration. From a symbolic standpoint, Texas imposes enormous 
prison sentences on many offenders and has been at the forefront of the public 
shaming movement. Texas, simply put, is tough on crime. 
Yet, the story of Texas criminal procedure is much more complicated and more 
pro-defendant than Texas's general reputation for punitiveness suggests. Texas 
defendants benefit from a variety of criminal procedure protections that go well 
beyond what is mandated by the Supreme Court of the United States. And contrary 
to the tough-on-crime rhetoric of Texas politicians, many of these criminal 
procedure protections could have been eliminated long ago because they are 
statutory, rather than judicial, rules. Yet, legislators have declined to repeal the 
numerous pro-defendant protections found in the Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure. 
The point of this Article is not to definitively resolve the reason for the Texas 
dichotomy. Nor is my goal to encourage legislators to abolish favorable rules of 
procedure. The aim of this Article is to demonstrate that Texas is not nearly as 
tough on criminal procedure as its reputation suggests. 
There are a number of possible reasons why Texas continues to retain a generous 
code of criminal procedure. Distrust of governmental power may explain the 
continued existence of certain protections against aggressive police tactics, while 
Texas's short legislative session may protect less prominent rules from being 
repealed. In the bigger picture, Texas's reputation for punitiveness may insulate 
legislators from pressure to scale back procedural protections. Texans may also see 
robust procedural protections as essential before punishing offenders for breaking 
the social compact. In all likelihood, all of these explanations have a role to play in 
explaining the wide divergence between Texas's reputation for punitiveness and its 
generous statutory code of criminal procedure. 
317. See PERKINSON, supra note 46. 
